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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v,

:

BRENT JACKSON, RAQUEL NIBL£SN,
AND PATRICIA E. SMITH,

:

Defendants-Appellants

:

Consolidated NO.950696-CA

Priority No. 2

JURISDICTION AMP NATURE OF FRQCBBPiygg
Defendants appeal from their guilty pleas to unlawful
possession or use of marijuana in a drug free zone, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i)
(1996), and unlawful possession or use of drug paraphernalia in a
drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1996), which pleas were conditioned upon the
right to challenge on appeal the denial of their motion to
suppress evidence.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (1995).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the police seizure and inspection of defendants'

curbside trash, which was clearly proper under the United States
Constitution, nevertheless violate the Utah Constitution?
Whether there is a state constitutional interest in trash left

outside the curtilage of a home is a question of law, reviewed de
novo by this Court.

State v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah

1996) (citing State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)).
2.

Did the trial court properly deny defendants' motion to

suppress on the basis that the search warrant was supported by
probable cause and issued in good faith?

In reviewing a denial

of a motion to suppress a search warrant, the appellate court
does not review the magistrate's determination of probable cause
de novo but "simply decide[s] if the 'magistrate had a
substantial basis for concluding that there were enough facts
within the affidavit to find that probable cause existed.'" State
v. Viah, 871 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah App. 1994) (citation omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUES AND RULES
U.S. Const. Amend IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Utah Const. Art. 1, Section 14:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
2

STATEMENT OF TCS CASS
Defendants, Brent Jackson, Patricia E. Smith, and Raquel
Nielsen, were charged with various drug-related felony and class
A misdemeanor offenses in connection with the search of their
home on June 8, 1994 (JR. 6-8; SR. 28-30; NR. 10-12).*
Defendants jointly moved to suppress the evidence from the
search which motion was denied (JR. 88-104; SR. 97-113; NR. 92107).

See addendum C for copy of Court's Ruling.

Defendants

then entered conditional guilty pleas to unlawful possession or
use of marijuana and unlawful possession or use of drug
paraphernalia, both in a drug free zones, class A misdemeanors
(JR. 110-21; SR. 119-30; NR. 113-24), with each reserving the
right to challenge the trial court's ruling (JR. 124-27; SR. 12730; NR. 127-30).

On October 10, 1995, defendants were sentenced

on each count to one year in jail and a $2500 fine, both
suspended upon 36 months probation (JR. 128-30; SR. 138-39; NR.
127-30).
Defendants separately appealed (JR. 136; SR. 145; NR. 139).
This Court consolidated the appeals.

1

JR refers to the Jackson record; SR to the Smith record; and NR to the Nielsen record.
These records were consolidated for purposes of appeal but are separately paginated.
3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants Jackson and Smith maintain a common-law marriage
and live in Provo, Utah, with defendant Nielsen, who is Smiths'
adult daughter by a prior relationship.

See Presentence Report

in Jackson Record.
In April 1994, several men broke into defendants' home and
demanded drugs and money.

The men removed marijuana and cocaine

from the home (JR. 82-83; SR. 91-92/ NR. 85-86).

After reporting

the incident to the police, defendants were granted immunity from
prosecution for any crime related to the April incident id.:
JR.22-24; SR. 16-18; NR. 13-15).
Early in the morning on June 8, 1994, police officers went
to defendants' home and observed two garbage cans with
defendants' house number stenciled on the sides sitting in the
street in front of the home.

The officers took the cans to the

police station where they searched through the trash, finding
marijuana stems and seeds, a marijuana cigarette, a small amount
of marijuana indicative of personal use, and Zig-zag papers (JR.
27-29, 82-83; SR. 7-8, 91-92; NR. 18-20, 85-86).
for copy of Search Affidavit and Warrant.

See addendum B

The police returned

the garbage cans to their location in front of defendants' home
for regular garbage pickup (id.).
4

Based on the results of their inspection of the trash, the
police secured and executed a search warrant for defendants' home
the same day (JR. 25-26, SR. 5-6 & 10, NR. 16-17).

Drugs and

drug paraphernalia were found in the home (SR.10).
SUMMARY QF AfrgPMgNT
The warrantless seizure and inspection of defendants' trash,
left in garbage cans outside the curtilage of their home for
garbage collection, does not implicct^ a constitutional interest.
The United States Supreme Court, all federal district courts, and
the majority of state courts which have considered the issue have
concluded that society does not recognize an expectation of
privacy in garbage.

While a handful of state courts have reached

a contrary conclusion based on interpretations of their state
constitutions, defendants have provided no historical,
contextual, or policy reason to find such a privacy interest
here.
The subsequent search warrant was supported by probable
cause.

The affidavit was based on relevant, recent, and truthful

information which, when viewed in its entirety, constituted a
sufficient basis to believe that drugs would be located in
de f endant s' home.

5

Even if this Court were to conclude that the warrant was
deficient, the trial court's finding of good faith defeats
defendants' argument that the evidence should be suppressed.
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION

Defendants first challenge the search warrant as defective,
claiming that the affidavit in support of the warrant lacked
probable cause.

They contend that if several paragraphs of the

affidavit are deleted as irrelevant, the remaining paragraphs are
insufficient to support the search because (1) any evidence found
in the prior inspection of defendants' trash did not establish a
present basis to believe that drugs were in the home, and (2) the
inclusion of Jackson's and Smith's prior drug dealings was
improper since defendants had been granted immunity from the
April 1994 crimes, and this bad act as well as a 1993 crime were
too remote in time to be relevant (Brief of Appellant [Br. App.],
Point I).

Next, they argue that no information from the seizure

and inspection of their trash should have been included in the
warrant because they have a state constitutional interest in
their garbage which precludes a warrantless police invasion (Br.
App., Point II). Defendants also assert that when the challenged
information is deleted, the affidavit so lacks probable cause as
6

to preclude any finding that it was issued in good faith (Br.
App. at 15-16 & 36-38).
Since the evidence found in defendants' garbage cans largely
formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant, no
determination of the sufficiency of the warrant may be made
without first determining the propriety of the warrantless trash
seizure and inspection.

If, as defendants contend, the

warrantless police action violated a state constitutional
interest, deleting that evidence from the affidavit would indeed
undermine the finding of probable cause. At that point, the only
issue would be whether the officers' good faith reliance on
existing law excused the deficiency.

For these reasons, the

State will address the points raised by defendants in reverse
order.

7

POINT I
TRASH LEFT FOR GARBAGE PICK-UP
A HOME IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY
CONSTITUTION.

OUTSIDE THE CURTILAGE OF
PROTECTED UNDER THE UTAH

1. The Fourth Amendment Does Not Recognize a
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Trash and Garbage.
Defendants concede that under the Fourth Amendment, there is
no constitutional expectation of privacy in trash left outside
the curtilage of a home.

California V. SreenWPQfl, 486 U.S. 35,

39-41, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1628-29 (1988).
The facts in Greenwood are nearly identical to those before
this Court.

Greenwood, a narcotics trafficker, placed

incriminating items in opaque plastic bags and then left the bags
on his curb for regular garbage collection.

Id. at 37 & 1627.

The police asked a garbage collector to bring them the bags after
he collected them but before they were commingled with any other
garbage.

Id.

When the collector did, the police inspected the

trash and, based on the discovery of incriminating items, secured
a search warrant for Greenwood's home. The search warrant was
executed and more drugs were found. Id. at 38 & 1627,
In reversing the state court's suppression of the evidence,
the United States Supreme Court assumed that Greenwood had a
subjective expectation that his trash would not be searched by

8

the police, but concluded that such an expectation was not
objectively reasonable, a critical requirement for constitutional
protection-2

Id. at 40-41, 1628-29.

Because Greenwood placed

the trash at the curb, a place "readily accessible to animals,
children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public,"
id.. he had "deposited [his] garbage %in an area particularly
suited for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public
consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take
it,' [and therefore he had] no reasonable expectation of privacy
in the inculpatory items that [he] discarded."
1629 (citation omitted)•

Id. at 40-41,

Since there was no constitutional

interest in the trash, the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment was inapplicable.

Id. at 41-43, 1629-30.

Even before Greenwood, a
reached the same conclusion.

majority of jurisdictions had
As the Supreme Court noted, its

determination "that society would not accept as reasonable [the]
claim to an expectation of privacy in trash left for collection

2

"An expectation of privacy is a question of intent, which 'may be inferred from words
spoken, acts done, and other objective facts."' State v. Matison. 875 P.2d 584,587-88 (Utah
App. 1994) (citations omitted). Only when such a personal expectation coincides with a
"societal understanding that [the place or object] deservesfs] the most scrupulous protection from
governmental invasion," is the expectation "legitimate." Greenwood. 486 U.S. at 43,108 S. Ct.
at 1630. S£S al§Q Rakas v. Illinois. 439 U.S. 128,143,99 S. Ct. 421,430 (1978); Katzv.
United States. 389 U.S. 347, 351-53, 88 S. Ct 507, 511-12 (1967) (establishing analytical
framework for determining when police action involves a constitutional interest).

9

in an area accessible to the public is reinforced by the
unanimous rejection of similar claims by the Federal Courts of
Appeals."

Id. at 41-42, 1629 (citing pre-existing decisions from

the first, second, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth,
and eleventh circuit courts of appeals).

Similarly, the majority

of state courts which had considered the issue prior to Greenwood
had "held that the police may conduct warrantless searches and
seizures of garbage discarded in public areas."

Id. at 42-43,

1630 (citing decisions from Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Illinois,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Dakota, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).

See discussion of

specific cases infra at 19-21.
Greenwood recognized that while the Fourth Amendment affords
no constitutional protection to discarded trash, states are free
to interpret the scope of their own constitutional search and
seizure provisions.

Id. at 43 & 1630.

Indeed, at the time of

Greenwood, Hawaii and California had done so. Today, four states
recognize a constitutional interest in trash under independent
readings of their state constitutions: these are Hawaii, New

10

Jersey, .crmont and Washington.3

See discussion of specific

cases infra at 23-27.
Such deviations from federal law are not simply a matter of
separate state procedural standing; rather, they determine if a
state constitutional interest exists.4

In this context, the

issue here is whether, under the Utah Constitution, there is a
protectible constitutional interest in trash or garbage left
outside the curtilage of a home such that police must have
probable cause to seize, inspect or otherwise search it?
2.
A Result Different than the Federal Standard is
not Warranted Under the Utah Constitution.
The federal constitution provides the minimum guarantee of
protections and rights; a state constitution may or may not
expand these.

Sims v. State Tax Com'n. 841 P.2d 6, 10 n.9 (Utah

3

Drfendant cites California and Indiana as recognizing a state constitutional privacy
interest. However, Moran v. State. 625 N.E.2d 1231 (Ind. App. 1993), was reversed by Moran
v. State. 644 N.E.2d 536 (Ind. 1994). Similarly, People v. Krivda. 486 P.2d 1262 (Calif. 1971)
has been effectively nullified by subsequent amendment of the California Constitution.
Greenwood. 486 U.S. at 38-39,108 S. Ct at 1628.
Defendant did not cite the recent decision of the Vermont Supreme Court recognizing a
legitimate expectation of privacy in trash on the basis that trash, like a search of a bedroom, can
reveal intimate details about a person's sexual practices, health and personal hygiene. Sss State
v. Morris. 680 A.2d 90 (Vt. 1996).
4

The common interchange of the term "standing" for "expectation of privacy" is
misleading. "Standing" involves justiciability and jurisdiction. Provo Citv Corp. v. Wilden. 768
P.2d 455,457 (Utah 1989). "Expectation of privacy" determines if there is a constitutional
question to resolve. State v. Thompson. 810 P.2d 415,416 n.2 (Utah 1991) .
11

1992).

But the fact that a state may create more expansive

rights, does not compel the conclusion that it has.

State v.

Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229, 1235, 1239 & 1241 (Utah 1996)
(disagreeing on analytical approach but concurring in result that
automobile exception is the same under state and federal
constitutions).

To guard against "result-oriented and therefore

unprincipled" state constitutional interpretation,5 the Utah
Supreme Court has articulated narrow criteria for departing from
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

However, these criteria do not

fully determine the court's discretion to depart from federal
standards.

Compare State v. Watts. 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 & n.8

(Utah 1988), with Anderson. 910 P.2d at 1242 (Durham, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (Watts was not "intended to indicate
that inconsistency and confusion in federal constitutional
analysis are the only reasons we undertake independent state
constitutional analysis.").
Applying the Watts criteria, Utah courts have given article
I, section 14 a more expansive interpretation only when federal

5

See Christine M. Durham, Employing the Utah Constitution in Utah Courts. 2 Utah
B.J., Nov. 1989 at 26. See sisfi State v. Poole. 871 P.2d 531,536 (Utah 1994) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (it is " inappropriate for this Court to use Article I, Section 14, the Utah unreasonable
search and seizure provision, to attempt to 'fine tune' federal constitutional search and seizure
law"; disagreement with a particular federal search and seizure opinion "does not justify
resorting to Article I, Section 14 to achieve a different result").
12

analysis of the challenged police action was plagued with
inconsistency and/or confusion.

Compare State v. Sims. 808 P.2d

141, 149 (Utah App. 1991), pet. for
improvidently

granted,

cert,

dismissed

as

881 P.2d 840 (Utah 1994) (relying on state

provisions to clarify confusion cause by federal case law), with
Sims v. State Tax Com'n. 841 P.2d at 15 (Stewart, J., concurring
in result) (conclusion that Sims' roadblock was illegal under
Utah Constitution is "dictum" since third justice found it
illegal under only the federal standard).

Compare also State v.

Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 466 (Utah 1990) (plurality concluding that
opening of car door to inspect vehicle identification constituted
a search under the state constitution), with Anderson. 910 P.2d
at 1235 & 1239 (federal and state automobile warrant exception
are identical after post-Larocco United States Supreme Court
decision "cured any confusion").
Defendant relies extensively on State v. Thompson. 810 P.2d
415 (Utah 1991), the only case in which a majority of the supreme
court agreed on an independent interpretation of article 1,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

In Thompson. 810 P.2d at

418, the Utah Supreme Court held that under the Utah
Constitution, individuals have a constitutional interest in their
bank records requiring probable cause before the records may be
13

seized.

The court found that federal law governing the seizure

of bank records was confused as a result of the much criticized
decision in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)(holding
that a depositor had no legitimate expectation of privacy in his
bank records), which conflicted with the more widely-followed
generalized expectation of privacy test enunciated in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52, 88 S. Ct. 507, 511 (1967)

(recognizing what a person "seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected").

Thompson. 810 P.2d at 417. The Utah Supreme Court

joined several other states that had already rejected Miller in
favor of Katz by concluding that *[s]ince it is virtually
impossible to participate in the economic life of contemporary
society without maintaining an account with a bank, opening a
bank account is not entirely volitional and should not be seen as
conduct which constitutes a waiver of an expectation of privacy."
Thompson. 810 P.2d at 418 (quotation and citations omitted).
Because depositors reasonably assume that information supplied to
a bank is confidential, the Utah Supreme Court held that under
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, defendants had
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"standing" to challenge the search and seizure of their bank
records.6

Id. at 418.

Despite the limited nature of the Thompson ruling,
defendants extrapolate that independent state interpretation is
mandated for all expectation of privacy issues due to the
"societal and historical context of the Utah Constitution," the
"primacy model," and, in this case, a limited number of noncontxoiling decisions from other states. Defendants are
mistaken.
(A) Utah's History Does Not Suggest
that
Mormons or Polygamists
Had a Greater
Interest
in Their Garbage Than Other
Societies.
Defendants argue that because Utah was settled by Mormons,
many of whom were subjected to prosecution for their polygamous
practices, framers of the Utah Constitution must have intended
greater protection of their citizen's "personal effects" than
under federal law.

Without further analysis, defendants then

conclude that this greater protection must necessarily extend to
discarded trash. (Br. App. at 21-26).

This conclusion is without

support.

6

Thompson's over-inclusive use of the term "standing" is understandable in light of the
issue. £fi£ discussion, supra at 11 n.4. The records sought were not in Thompson's possession
but reflected Thompson's interactions with the bank.
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Had the framers of Utah's constitution been dissatisfied
with the scope of protection provided by the Fourth Amendment,
they would presumably have drafted a textually different search
and seizure provision, rather than adopting language that is
nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment.

Indeed, the

development of Utah's search and seizure provision prior to the
adoption of article I, section 14 reflects a steady movement by
the framers toward adoption of the precise wording of the Fourth
Amendment.

See addendum A for textual history of article I,

section 14. With each progressive revision of Utah's search and
seizure provision, its language became more similar to that of
the Fourth Amendment.

While the original 1849 version

significantly differed from its federal counterpart, that
difference was abandoned in 1872 in favor of language very
similar to that of the Fourth Amendment.

This path of growing

similarity continued until 1895, when the present provision,
essentially identical to the federal, was adopted.7
Even in those cases where article I, section 14 has been
construed differently than the Fourth Amendment, the distinction

7

In contrast, theframerswere not hesitate to adopt dissimilar language in other portions
of the constitution when it was clear that they wished to departfromthe federal standard. Sep
Society of Separationists v. Whitehead. 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993) (explaining historical
development of Utah Const, art. I , § § 1 & 4).
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has not beer based on historical criteria.

Instead, Utah courts

have implicitly recognized that there is nothing in Utah's
history, and especially the history of article I, section 14,
that justifies departing from federal search and seizure
standards.

Rather than relying on the historical context, Utah

courts have departed from federal search and seizure standards
only in the limited circumstances articulated in Watts.

See

Thompson. 810 P.2d at 418 (poorly reasoned, conflicting, and
confusing federal precedent governing expectation of privacy in
bank records justified independent analysis); Sims. 808 P.2d at
149 (confusing federal precedent and existing state statutory law
compelled result); Larocco. 794 P.2d at 469 (confusing and
inconsistent approaches taken regarding car searches justified
differing result) (plurality opinion).
(B) Neither Policy Nor Confusion
Governing Police Seizure/Inspection
Justify
a Departure from Federal

in the Law
of Trash
Standards.

Defendants assert that under the "primacy model," state
courts must necessarily look to their own constitutions before
considering federal interpretation (Br. App. at 26-29).

While

discussed, the primacy approach has not been utilized by Utah
courts except in instances where the state constitutional
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provision predates its federal counterpart or the language of the
state provision is unique.8
While our supreme court justices have differed on what
analytical approach should apply, £££, e.g.. Anderson. 910 P.2d
1229, the justices have concurred on the ultimate policy to be
reached.

In Larocco. members of the court were concerned with

creating a more workable rule for police and trial courts than
the then-ambiguously defined federal standard.

Similarly, in

Thompson, the court rejected an analytically flawed federal
decision in favor of the traditional concept of privacy reflected
by the realities of modern life. Without such clear statements
of the policy bases for any new state rule, trial courts and law
enforcement would be left without guidance on the rule's
application.

Cf. Anderson. 910 P.2d at 1239 (Zimmerman, C.J.,

concurring in result).
Here, defendants' analysis under the primacy approach is no
more than a recognition that such an approach exists. As such,

8

Compare. SLgx generalized discussion of appropriate analytical model in Anderson. 910
P.2d at 1239-42 (Zimmerman, C.J., Stewart, J., and Durham, J., separate concurring opinions),
SflJh actual analysis applied in ThQpipgQq, 810 P.2d at 416-18, and Larocco. 794 P.2d at 465-71,
and with analysis applied in Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661,670 (Utah 1984) (comparing Utah's
uniform operation of laws provision with federal equal protection provision); Society of
Separationists. 870 P.2d at 930 (analyzing state establishment of religion provision); and
American Fork Citv v. Crosgrove. 701 P.2d 1069,1071-72 (Utah 1985) (interpreting scope of
right against self-incrimination found in article 1, section 12 of the Utah Constitution).
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it is deficient. &££. State v. Brooks. 849 P.2d 640, 645 (Utah
App.), cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993)(merely relying
"upon general statements that Utah has a unique history and that
in some cases, other states have interpreted their constitutions
to provide broader protections that the United States
Constitution" does not provide a sufficient reason for an
independent rule).

But defendants failure is two-fold, for they

also fail to advance any practical or theoretical reason for more
broadly construing article 1, section 14.

In the context of

trash, none exists.
The majority view that discarded trash is not
constitutionally protected rests on several rationales.

Some

courts based their analysis on principles of abandonment: the
very term "garbage" necessarily implies that the owner has
discarded and relinquished any interest in the item.

See, e.g..

United States v. Kramer. 711 F.2d 789, 792 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied/ 464 U.S. 962 (1983); Commonwealth v. Perdue. 564 A.2d
489, 492-93 (Pa. Super. 1989), appeal denied, 574 A.2d 68 (Pa
1990).

Others have applied an "assumption of risk" theory.

See,

e.g.. State v, Stevens, 367 N.W.2d 788, 795 (Wis.), cert, denied.
474 U.S. 852 (1985)("the risk of a police search of garbage is
assumed in the routine disposal of garbage by municipal
19

employees") . Still others consider whether the police ''trespass'
to seize the garbage a critical factor.

See State v. Krech. 403

N.W.2d 634, 636 (Minn. 1987) (accepting that property left for
collection is "abandoned" but viewing the "real issue" as
"whether the police violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights
in going onto the land in order to seize the abandoned
property").

But Compare United States v. Hedrick.. 922 F.2d 396,

398-400 (7th Cir.), cert denied. 502 U.S. 847 (1991)(garbage
within curtilage of home but readily viewable by the public is
"knowingly exposed" to the public for Fourth Amendment purposes
and may be seized by the police).
By far the mostly widely adopted rationale is that found in
Greenwood: accessibility by the public.
S. Ct. at 1628-29.

486 U.S. at 40-41, 108

Typical is People v. Hillman. 834 P.2d 1271,

1277 (Colo. 1992) in which the Colorado Supreme Court held that
reality dedicated that "individuals do not have reasonable
expectations of privacy when their garbage is readily accessible
to members of the public."9 The court stated:

9

At the same time, the court noted that "there may be circumstances in which a resident
may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage bags that are so positioned within the
curtilage of a residence as to not be readily accessible to the public. In so finding, however, we
do not premise our holding on theories of abandonment of interests in property or assumption of
risk." Hillman. 834 P.2d at 1277 n.17.
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"The obvious distinction between garbage cans and other
containers is that it is 'common knowledge' that
members of the public often sort through other people's
garbage, and that the garbage is eventually removed by
garbage collectors on a regular basis."
Id. at 1275 (quoting Hedrick. 922 F,2d at 399 (citing Greenwood.
486 U.S. at 40, 108 S. Ct. at 1629)). See also State v. Texel.
433 N.W.2d 541, 543 (Neb. 1989) ("no reasonable expectation of
privacy exists in garbage which has been made accessible to the
public"); People v. Collins. 478 N.E.2d 267, 279 (111. 1985),
cert, denied. 474 U.S. 935 (1985)(police search of garbage "was
no more intrusive than what the defendant might have expected
from passing tenants, vagrants, neighborhood children, or
animals").10
The federal and majority approach is reasonable.

Unlike

financial information which is generally viewed as confidential
and personal, Thompson. 810 P.2d at 4:: 5, the modern realities of
trash are that vagrants and scavengers commonly invade garbage
containers--at whatever location--to find food and other items of
value.

Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40 n.3, ICi S. Ct. at 1629 n.3.

£££ alSfi Lars Eigher, Travels with Lizbeth: Three Years on the

10

Other post-Greenwood r.Ats cases finding no expectation of privacy in trash include
State v. Fisher. 591 So.2d 1049 (Fla. App. 1991); Perkins v. State. 398 S.E.2d 702 (Ga. App.
1990); Walls v. State. 536 So.2d 137 (Ala. App. 1988); and State v. Henderson. 435 N.W.2d 394
(Iowa App. 1988), cert, denied. 490 U.S. 1020 (1989). This list is by no means exhaustive.

21

Road and on the Streets, at 111-25 (1993) (explaining the
lifestyle of Mumpster diving") (copy attached in addendum D ) .
Moreover, unlike economic transactions which realistically
require some bank involvement, Thompson. 810 P.2d at 418, there
are many ways for an individual to dispose of unwanted items.
They can burn them, shred them, mutilate identifying information,
or leave the incriminating items at remote locations. Neat
disposal of the evidence of crime in city-approved trash
containers in front of one's home is only one of many options.
Most importantly, acceptance of defendants' argument would
result in an overly broad, unworkable rule.

Defendants assert

that their trash is constitutionally protected, no matter what
its location, until it is commingled with other garbage and loses
its identity (Br. App. at 29-36, relying on state constitutional
decisions).

This would create an artificial dual standard.

From

the moment the trash is placed for collection at defendants'
curb, garbage collectors and other strangers would have access to
it.

After collection, all control over the trash transfers from

defendants to strangers, who have no realistic restrictions on
either their physical access or use of the garbage.

Yet, under

defendants' theory, the police would still be precluded from
receiving, viewing, or otherwise examining the discarded items.
22

Only . r the point that defendants' trash is physically
w

commingled" with other trash, thereby losing its identity, would

the police obtain the same ^rights" as the strangers.

Such a

result curtails police action even while the general public has
full access to the "private" trash.

This result is unreasonable.

£L~ State Vt Belgard, 840 P.2d 819, 823 (Utah App. 1992) (**For
an officer to look at what is in open viev ~~om a position
lawfully accessible to the public cannot constitute an invasion
of a reasonable expectation of privacy'," quoting State v. Lee.
633 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1981)).
The consistent, clear, and reasonable approach taken by
federal courts and the majority of jurisdictions should be
followed here: trash placed for garbage collection is not
constitutionally protected from police inspection and seizure.
(C) Non-Controlling
Case Law from Other
Jurisdictions
Does Not Justify
a
Different
Result.
Four states currently recognize a state constitutional
interer

^n trash.

See supra at 10-11 & n.3.

None are

persuas ve.
State V. Tanaka, 701 P-2d 1274 (Haw. 1985), is a preGreenwood decision.

With little discussion and no analysis, the

Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that because state precedent
23

recognized an expectation of privacy in objects placed in closed
containers, trash in opaque plastic garbage bags would also
necessarily be protected.

Tanaka. 701 P.2d at 1275-76. Notably,

the trash bags in question were not placed for collection at the
time they were searched; instead, the police "trespassed onto
private property."

Id. at 1275. Defendants ignore this factual

distinction but the trial court did not.
95-96.

See addendum, Ruling at

The trial court saw significance in both the trespass and

Hawaii's constitution's unique provision requiring a compelling
state interest to override a citizen's right to privacy.11

Id.

at 95.
Similarly, in State v. Boland. 800 P.2d 1112 (Wash 1990),
the police observed Boland take his garbage can to the curb for
collection and secure the lid by placing a heavy piece of wood on
it.

The police emptied the trash can and examined the contents

at the police station.

Based on the incriminating items found,

the police obtained a search warrant for the home. Boland, 800

11

Tanaka involved three separate searches. The trial court in this case noted that in two
of the cases, the intrusions were trespasses but believed that in the third case, the trash was
outside the curtilage. See addendum C Ruling at 96. This is incorrect. The Tanaka opinion
stated that the police "entered defendants' property," 701 P.2d at 1276, noting that if it were to
hold other than it did, "police could search everyone's trash bags on their property without any
reason and thereby learn of their activities, associations, and beliefs." IJL at 1277 (emphasis
added).
24

P.2d at 1113.

The Washington Supreme Court concluded that since

local ordinances required Boland to place his garbage can in the
street and another ordinance made it unlawful for anyone to
remove the contents without authorization, Boland reasonably
expected the trash to be protected from police intrusion.
1114-15.

Id. at

Further, since the Washington Constitution protects the

"private affairs" of its citizenry, trash, which can reveal
"private affairs," is constitutionally protected whatever its
location

Id. at 1115-17. This broad interpretation of the

Washington Constitution has not been limited to trash: Washington
recognizes a privacy interest in jail property boxes, locked
trunks of impounded vehicles, and locked containers in searched
vehicles; it also precludes the warrantless installation of pen
registers, despite United States Supreme Court decisions to the
contrary.

Id. at 1115 & 1117. Like Tanaka. the uniqueness of

the Washington constitutional provision distinguishes this case
from the present one.12

See addendum C, Ruling at 94.

On the other hand, State v. Hempele. 576 A.2d 793 (N.J.

12

Boland has bee^ applied in a limited manner in Washington. In State v. Rodriguez,
828 P.2d 636,642 (Wa^h,. rev, denied, 838 P.2d 692 (Wash. 1992), the court refused to find a
privacy interest in tram placed in a bag thrown on top of an apartment community dumpster.
The court distinguished Boland by finding that the trash was "not garbage ordinarily
accumulated in a household, but rather is stolen property defendant is apparently attempting to
hide." LI
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1990) is indistinguishable from this case.

See addendum C,

Ruling at 93-94, 97, Hempele placed controlled substances in a
plastic trash bag which he then placed in his garbage can in
front of his home. Hempele. 576 A.2d at 796.

In interpreting

its constitutional search and seizure provision, a provision
similar to Utah's, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the
Katz-Rakas two-prong test for expectation of privacy, asking
instead whether nit is reasonable for a person to want to keep
the contents of his or her garbage private."
(emphasis in original).

;rd. at 801-02

Comparing the action of leaving a

garbage bag on the street to leaving a letter in a mailbox for
pickup, id. at 805, the court concluded that *[g]iven the secrets
that refuse can disclose, it is reasonable for a person to prefer
that his or her garbage remain private,"

Id. at 803. The

weaknesses of the court's analysis can best be seen by its
inaccurate conclusion that the contents of a letter left in a
mailbox is as *%readily accessible' to snoops and others" as
trash, id. at 805, and its observation that, while it was unsure
if garbage collectors had the legal right to examine trash or
consent to a police search, the collector's rights should be
construed similarly to a "landlord's."
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Id. at 805-06.

The convoluted reasoning of Hempele was not followed by the
Indiana Court in Moran v. State. 625 N.E.2d 1231 (Ind. App.
1993), reversed by Moran v. State. 644 N.E.2d 536 (Ind. 1994).
The original Moran decision, cited by defendant and relied upon
by the trial court, simply adopted the reasoning of the Greenwood
dissent, concluding that garbage was constitutionally protected
under the Indiana Constitution.

The court reasoned that it made

no difference if the trash was on a defendant's property or left
at curbside; in either case, placing the trash outside for the
"sole purpose of having the trash collector take it and mingle it
with the trash of thousand of other citizens is to manifest an
expectation that it will remain secure and private, at a minimum,
until removed by the trash collector."

Moran. 625 N.E.2d at

123 9. As the trial court recognized, Moran fully supports
defendants' argument, but constitutes a limited exception to the
overwhelming majority view that no such constitutional interest
exists, fias. addendum C, Ruling at 93-94.

However, defendant

failed to acknowledge below or now on appeal that Moran's state
constitutional holding has been reversed by the Indiana Supreme
Court. fi££ Moran v. State. 644 N.E.2d at 539-541.

Indiana has

now fully adopted the Greenwood standard and does not recognize a
constitutional interest in curbside trash.
27

Id.

In sum, the handful of cases which have found an
expectation of privacy in trash have either based their decisions
on the unique language of their state constitutions, are
supported by poor reasoning, or have been rejected by their own
superior court.

They provide no policy, legal, or factual

rationales that have not been considered and rejected by the
majority of state and federal courts. Without a legitimate basis
to extend state constitutional protection, this Court should
reject defendants' arguments that they have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in trash left for collection.
3. Even If This Court Were to Find A State
Constitutional Interest in Discarded Trash, the
Officers in this Case Acted Reasonably and in Good
Faith.
Interestingly, after concluding that a constitutionally
protected interest in trash existed, the Indiana Court of Appeals
in Moran concluded that their holding did not invalidate the
search:
At the time when the warrant was issued, however, no
Indiana court had ruled on the issue of warrantless
searches of curbside trash. Therefore, it was
reasonable for the officers to determine the legality
of the warrantless search by reliance on Greenwood.
Moran. 625 N.E.2d at 1241, reversed on other grounds, 644 N.E.2d
536.

Accord United States v. Thorton. 746 F.2d 39, 49 (D.C. Cir.
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1984) (concluding based on pre-Greenwood law that it was
"eminently reasonable" for the officers to believe that a trash
search was constitutional).
In this case, the trial court adopted similar reasoning and
found, in the alternative, that even if a state constitutional
interest did exist, the court would uphold the validity of the
search of the home on the basis of the good faith exception.

See

addendum C, Ruling at 90.
Defendants attack this ruling by encouraging this Court to
do what has not been done in any other Utah case, wto decide
whether there is a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution."
810 P.2d at 419.

Thompson.

Defendants acknowledge that if there is no

expectation of privacy in trash, there is no reason to reach this
issue (Br. App. at 36) .13
"The 'prime purpose' of the [federal] exclusionary rule, if
not the sole one, %is to deter future unlawful police conduct.'"
State v. Ziealman, 905 P.2d 883, 887 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting

United States v, Janis, 428 u.s. 433, 446, 96 s. ct. 3021, 3028
13

On the other hand, defendants contend that even if there is no separate state
constitutional interest, the warrant is otherwise sufficiently defective that under United States v.
Leon. 468 U.S. 897,104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), the officers did not act in good faith in securing the
warrant See infra at 43-44.
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(1976)).
1993).

Accord State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1263-64 (Utah

Because the federal rule was "designed to deter police

misconduct rather than to punish the error of judges and
magistrates," an exception to its blanket application was
created3417.

United States v. Leon. 468 U.S. at 916, 104 S. Ct. at

That exception recognizes:
[ W]hen law enforcement officers have acted in
objective good faith or their transgressions have been
minor, the magnitude of the benefit conferred on such
guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the
criminal justice system. Indiscriminate application of
the exclusionary rule, therefore, may well "generate
disrespect for the law and administration of justice."
Accordingly, "as with any remedial device, the
application of the [exclusionary] rule has been
restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives
are thought most efficaciously served."

Leon. 468 U.S. at 908, 104 S. Ct. at 3412-13.
As defendants note, some states have rejected application of
a good faith exception under their state constitutions (Br. App.
at 36-38) . But defendants have not articulated a basis for this
Court to reach a similar conclusion.

See limited argument below

at JR. 204 (counsel admitting that he was "standing flat footed"
in response to court's opinion that officers acted in good faith
by followed existing law); and lack of analysis on appeal, Br.
App. at 36-38.)

£&& alfiC Phillips v. Hatfield. 904 P.2d 1108,

1110 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Price. 827 P.2d 247, 249-50 (Utah
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App. 1992) (court declines to reach merits of issue due to
inadequate legal analysis).
Furthermore, even those courts who have rejected a state
good faith exception have recognized that *the more important
issue is not the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule on the
conduct of the individual magistrates, but ~.he extent to which
the rule helps preserve the integrity of the warrant issuing
process as a whole."

State V, Marsala/ 579 A.2d 58# 67 (Conn.

1990) (cited in Thompson. 810 P.2d at 420 n.4).
Here, neither future deterrence nor the integrity of the
warrant process are implicated.

These officers fully comported

with all existing legal regulations at the time of the search
and, therefore, their reliance on that precedent was necessarily
in good faith.

Compare State v. Shou:derblade. 905 P.2d 289, 294

(Utah 1995)(results of roadblock search could not be saved where
officers did not seek prior judicial approval in light of
ambiguous existing law).

By admitting that the officers acted

reasonably in relying on Fourth Amendment law (Br. App. at 17;
JR. 178, 204, 220, 223-24), defendants have essentially conceded
this fact.

Just as an attorney cannot be expected to anticipate

a new judicial decision, State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah
1993) (ineffectiveness claim must be evaluated in light of the
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law existing at the time of the trial), a police officer should
not be considered "deficient" for acting in conformity with
governing law at the time of the search.
For these reasons, whatever the scope of a state
exclusionary rule, a good faith exception should validate police
action done in compliance with then-existing law.
* * *

While a minority of states have concluded, based on their
state constitutions, that individuals have an expectation of
privacy in their trash left at curbside for collection and have
rejected a good faith exception to their state exclusionary rule,
the weight of authority and reason clearly dictate against such
results.

This Court should reject defendants' arguments.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE SEARCH
WARRANT WAS SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE.

Even if defendants lack a constitutional interest in their
trash, defendants nevertheless argue that the warrant was
defective in that it lacked probable cause (Br. App. at 5-16).
In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress a search
warrant, the appellate court does not review the magistrate's
determination of probable cause de novo but "simply decide[s] if
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the 'magistrate had a substantial Lasis for concluding that there
were enough facts within the affidavit to find that probable
cause existed,'" State v. Vigh. 871 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah App.
1994) (citation omitted).

That is, there must be "a substantial

basis to conclude that -in the totality of circumstances, the
affidavit adequately established,"' . . . *%"a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place".'"

State V, Strgmfrerg, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah

App. 1989)(quoting State V. Drpnebur?/ 781 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Utah
App. 1989) (quoting Illinois Y» GatSS/ 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.
Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983))).
Despite this standard, defendants attempt to piecemeal the
affidavit by viewing each paragraph in isolation. But as this
Court has concluded, the paragraphs of an affidavit are not to be
be viewed independently of each other; instead, the affidavit
must read as a whole with some paragraphs providing background
and context to others.

Cf. Vigh. 871 P.2d at 1033; Stromberg.

783 P.2d at 57. At first glance, it appears that the trial court
erroneously accepted defendants' approach and viewed some
paragraphs as *irrelevant" because they were *spurious to the
magistrate's determination of probable cause."
Ruling at 102-03.

See addendum C,

But the trial court accepted defendants'
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approach only as an

analytical short-cut to its conclusion that

the warrant was valid, for the court continued: "Assuming
arguendo, that all the paragraphs mentioned by Defendants in
their memorandum were determined to be irrelevant, and therefore,
removed from consideration, State v. Potter. 860 P.2d 952 (Utah
App. 1993), there is still sufficient information in the
affidavit to be establish probable cause."

See addendum C,

Ruling at 102. The trial court's conclusion is correct.
1. Defendants' Claim that Some Paragraphs Should Be
Excised as Irrelevant is Without Merit.
Defendants argue that paragraphs 1-4 and 9-12 are irrelevant
to the determination of probable cause. Defendants' are wrong.
Paragraph 1 of the affidavit sets forth the background of
the affiant, including his specialized training in the area of
narcotics.
Warrant.

See addendum B, Affidavit in Support of Search
Information concerning an officer's training and

experience may legitimately be considered in determining probable
cause: an officer's specialized drug trafficking training
provides a foundation for any statements identifying substances
as drugs or describing common elements of illicit trafficking.
State v. Spuraeon. 904 P.2d 220, 226 (Utah App. 1995).

Here the

statements provide a foundation to establish the validity of
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paragraph 6, setting forth the affiant's observation of marijuana
and marijuana-related items in defendants' trash.14
Additionally, the affiant's training and experience provide a
basis for his statements concerning the common practices of drug
traffickers contained in paragraphs 8-12.
Paragraphs 2 & 3 concern defendants' past association with
drugs.

These paragraphs are relevant to show the continuing,

rather than isolated, nature of defendants' involvement in
illicit drug usage and/or trafficking.

While prior bad acts

without more cannot establish probable cause, Vigh, 871 P.2d at
1033, prior criminal involvement may be a legitimate factor to be
considered in combination with other information in determining
probable cause, id.

See also State v. Bailey. 675 P.2d 1203,

1204 SL 12C- (Utah 1984) (upholding affidavit in support of search
warrant
crirr

^ed in part on suspects ''extensive record" for same
m g investigated); Stromberg. 783 P.2d at 55 (noting

defe

ant's prior drug conviction corroborated informant's

assertions of an on-going pattern of drug usage).

14

See infra at

In Point 1(b)(6) of their brief, defendants argue that the magistrate should have required
the police to produce the marijuana they field-tested so that the magistrate could examine it.
Defendants cite no authority for such a requirement. Further, it is unnecessary for purposes of
probable cause: the magistrate could rely on the officer's training and experience in identifying
controlled substances. Defendants' argument establishes the relevance of including an officer's
expertise in an affidavit.
35

38-41 for further argument considering the validity of these
paragraphs.
Paragraph 4 summarizes the method and timing of Provo's
trash collection.

This information is relevant to establishing

the propriety of the time between normal pick-ups, which is
directly relevant to establishing when the objects would
reasonably have been placed in the garbage can. See addendum C,
Ruling at 102. £££ slSQ State v, Collard, 810 P.2d 884, 886
(Utah App. 1991) (affidavit should be given a "common-sense"
reading, relying on Illinois V. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.
Ct. 2317, 2331 (1983)).

The relevance of paragraph 4 becomes

even more self-evident when viewed in light of defendants'
current claim that the items could have been in the garbage can
for "weeks or months."

See discussion infra at 37-38.

Paragraphs 9, 10 and 12 reflect the affiant's knowledge,
based on his specialized training and experience, of the common
characteristics of drug traffickers.

While these paragraphs do

not independently establish probable cause for the search, they
do define the parameters of the search.

As such, they are

relevant in limiting the scope of the search.
Most interestingly, defendants attack paragraph 11 as being
irrelevant.

Paragraph 11 describes with particularity the home
36

to be searched, providing a detailed description of the color and
configuration of the home and not simply relying on a street
number.

Inclusion of such paragraphs is not only standard but

recommended for the protection of the public by preventing
searches of the wrong home based on an erroneous numerical
address,

QfL. State v. Mclntire. 768 P.2d 970, 972-73 (Utah App.

1989) (description in affidavit of place to be search may "cure"
lack or mistake in description in warrant).
Since the challenged paragraphs are relevant when read in
the context of the entire affidavit, they were properly included
and properly considered by the magistrate in issuing the warrant.
2. Defendants' Claim that Some Paragraphs Should Be
Excised as Stale or Improper Lacks Merit.
Defendants next contend that paragraphs 2-8 should not be
considered in determining the sufficiency of the affidavit
because they contain stale information.

Defendants' argument is

two-fold: first, they assert that the information gained through
inspection of their trash was stale; and second, they claim that
inclusion of their prior involvement with drugs was too remote in
time to be relevant.

Neither claim undermines the validity of

the warrant.
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(A) The Reasonable Inference
is that the
Trash Was in the Garbage Can One Week or
Less.
The trial court rejected defendants' argument that the
evidence in the trash can was stale.
102.

See addendum C, Ruling at

The court found: "While it is conceivable that the trash

could have been there for longer than a week# it is reasonable
for the magistrate to conclude that the trash had been in the
containers for a week or less."

Id.

This finding was supported

by paragraph 4 of the affidavit, which established that
defendants' trash was picked up on a weekly basis, and by
paragraph 5, which stated that the trash cans were placed "in the
street in front of [defendants] house."
Affidavit.

See addendum B,

These facts support the reasonable inference that the

contents was placed in the garbage can sometime between the
weekly pick-ups.

Defendants' assertion that the trash may have

been there for months is speculation unsupported by "common
sense."

See Collard. 810 P.2d at 886.
(B) The Inclusion
of Defendants'
Prior
Acts Supports in Part the Determination
Probable
Cause.

Bad
of

The affidavit in support of the search warrant was signed on
June 8, 1994. One month before, in May 1994, defendant Smith
pled guilty to possession of marijuana and possession of
38

paraphernalia based on incidents occurring" in January 1993.
Additionally, two months before the warrant was secured,
defendants Smith and Jackson claimed that several men broke into
their home demanding drugs and money.

See addendum B# Affidavit,

Paragraphs 2 & 3.
Defendants attacked the inclusion of this information as
stale and additionally attacked the inclusion of the drug robbery
as improper based on a grant of immunity from prosecution in
connection with the April incident.

After referring to both

claims, the trial court ruled: "While Defendants [sic] do not
support their position with any case law or statutory claim, it
does strike the Court as improper to justify a search on the
prior history of the individuals to be searched."

See addendum

C, Ruling at 101-02. The court then went on to conclude that the
"Affidavit is not fatally flawed and that a substantial basis
existed in the Affidavit, under current law, for the magistrate
to issue the warrant.''

Id. at 101.

It is unclear from this

ruling if the court found the information to be either stale or
improper.

However, subsequently, in ruling on defendants'

petition for certificate of probable cause, the trial court made
clear that, in ruling on the motion to suppress, he deemed the
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prior crimes information to be relevant and recent (JR. 140-41;
SR. 149-50; NR. 143-44).
n

A mere passage of time does not necessarily invalidate the

supporting basis for the warrant."
127, 131 (Utah 1987).

State v. Hansen. 732 P.2d

Instead, the issue is whether the

information adds to the "determination that evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place."

Brooks. 849 P.2d at 644

(citing Gates. 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332).
When the affidavit recites a mere isolated violation it
would not be unreasonable to imply that probable cause
dwindles rather quickly with the passage of time.
However, where the affidavit properly recites facts
indicating activity of a protracted and continuous
nature, a course of conduct, the passage of time
becomes less significant.
Strombera. 783 P.2d at 57 (quoting United States v. Johnson. 461
F.2d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 1972)).
Here defendants have challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence in the trash to support probable cause because they
argue small amounts of marijuana indicate only an isolated
incident of use and not on-going activity of drug usage (Br. App.
at 14). This is exactly why the prior crimes information is
relevant.

It establishes that two months prior to finding

marijuana in the trash, defendants admitted that they possessed
other controlled substances in the home.
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During that same

interval, defendant Smith, the mother of one defendant and
common-law wife of other, pled guilty to drug possession arising
from an incident the previous year.

Certainly, these prior acts

could not alone establish probable cause, but they are probative
of the fact that the evidence found in the trash reflected an ongoing lifestyle, not merely an isolated incident.
Defendants' next claim that the police intentionally
disregarded the truth when they failed to include a statement in
the affidavit that defendants had received immunity from
prosecution for "any crime disclosed by [their] testimony arising
out of incidents which occurred on April 13, 199411 in connection
with the drug-related burglary and robbery at their home.
Immunity Grants (JR. 22-24; SR. 16-18; NR. 13-15).

See

Again,

defendants' argument lacks merit.
An affiant may not intentionally, knowingly, or with
reckless disregard for the truth omit information from an
affidavit; if he does so, the omitted information must be
inserted into the affidavit before making a determination of the
affidavit's sufficiency.

State v. Nielsen. 727 P.2d 188, 191

(Utah 1986) (citing Flunks V, Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72, 98
S. Ct. 2674, 2684-85 (1978), and United States v. Ippolito. 774
F.2d 1482, 1486-87 n.l (9th Cir. 1985) (other citations omitted)),
41

cert, denied. 480 U.S. 930 (1987).

n

[I]f the omission or

misstatement materially affects the finding of probable cause,
any evidence obtained under the improperly issued warrant must be
suppressed."

Nielsen. 727 P.2d at 191.

Defendant questions the truthfulness of the information
contained in paragraph 2 of the affidavit, which reads:
On April 13, 1994, several unidentified men entered the
home of Pat Smith and Brent Jackson at 770 South 1033
West in Provo at 7:15 a.m. without permission.
According to Smith and Jackson the men held them
captive for several hours demanding drugs and money.
The men wanted to know where the drugs were.
Defendant does not contend that this information is incorrect,
but argues that it is incomplete in that the police did not
include that they had obtained this information from defendants
after granting them immunity from prosecution.

Defendants,

however, do not establish how the omitted information is material
or how its omission was misleading.
Defendants' grants of immunity prohibited their prosecution
for crimes they disclosed in connection with the April incident.
They have not been prosecuted for those crimes.

But the grants

of immunity do not preclude the prosecution of defendants for
crimes after April 1994, nor do they preclude the use of their
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former testimony for some purpose other than prosecution (JR. 7678; SR. 85-87; NR. 79-81).
Furthermore, inclusion of the omitted information concerning
the immunity would not have diminished probable cause, if
anything, it would have enhanced it by establishing that
defendants themselves admitted, under reliable circumstances,
that they store drugs in the home.
3. Defendants' Argument that the Warrant is so
Defective as to Preclude Good Faith Reliance is Without
Merit.
Apart from their state constitutional claim, defendants
argue that the warrant--once the allegedly stale, misleading and
irrelevant paragraphs are deleted--so lacks in probable cause
that the police could not reasonably rely on it.
The State submits that no good-faith analysis under United
States v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), is

necessary because the affidavit is not defective and is supported
by probable cause.

Should this Court disagree and conclude that

error occurred, the only error fatal to probable cause would be
the exclusion of the evidence obtained from defendants' trash.
For the reasons discussed supra at 28-32# the officers
reasonably relied on existing precedent in obtaining and
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including that information in the affidavit and, therefore, this
Court should find their reliance to be in good faith.
CPHCLVSIPN
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the trial
court's denial of defendants' motion to suppress and affirm
defendants' convictions based on their guilty pleas.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^9^")day of October, 1996.

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

I, HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVISION IN UTAH CONSTITUTION.
The following history may be found at the Utah State
Archives under the title "Constitution State of Deseret and Utah
Constitutions, Memorials to Congress, and Proceedings of
Convention 1649-1959,•» Microfilm Document No. 080979, C. Reel I
(1849-1695), Utah State Archives No. 700-0000-1400:
1. Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution of the
State of Deseret (1649):
The people shall be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and possessions, from
unreasonable searches and seizures.
2. Article I, Section 18 of the Constitution of the
State of Deseret (1872):
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not
be violated; and not warrant shall issue but
on probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the
place or places to be searched, and the
person or persons, and thing or things, to be
seized.
3. Article I, Section 16 of the Constitution of the
State of Utah (1882) :
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not
be violated; and not warrant shall issue but
on probable cause, supported by ...- or
affirmation, particularly desert ~ng the
place or places to be searched, and the
person or persons, and thing or things, to be
seized.
4. Article I, Section 19 of the Constitution of the
State of Utah (1887):
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not
be violated, and not warrant shall issue but
on probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

State of Utah (1895) (current provision):
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable seizures and searches shall not
be violated; and not warrant shall issue but
on probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or thing
to be seized.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, house, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

ADDENDUM B

RELEASED ?v THS 0 0 1 ) ^ ATTORNEY TO
CARLYLE K. BRYSON, #0473
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
JAMES R. TAYLOR, #3199
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY
1 0 0 E a s t C e n t e r , S u i t e 2100
P r o v o , Utah 84601
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 3 7 0 - 8 0 2 6
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
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IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OP UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAHf EX PARTB,
IN THE MATTER OF:

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF AND REQUEST FOR
SEARCH WARRANT

A NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION
Comes now Jerry Harper, having been duly sworn, who deposes
and states as follows:
1. I am a sergeant with the Provo Police Department. I have
been a peace officer since 1979 when I graduated from POST as the
officer with the highest academic achievement in my class. During
the time I have been a peace officer I have received over 225 hours
of specialized training for law enforcement work including 185
hours of training specific to narcotics work. Narcotics classes
include training in surveillance, operation of surveillance and
electronic investigatory equipment, field testing of drugs and drug
recognition. As an officer I have participated in hundreds of
operations involving the undercover purchase of narcotics and/or
the arrest of persons for substance abuse related violations. I
have experience working undercover providing first hand experience
with narcotics trafficking.
I have supervised narcotics
investigations for the Provo Police Department since 1992. I am
currently designated as the department trainer/specialist in the
areas of fingerprinting, surveillance, video equipment, narcotics
and drug recognition.
2. On April 13, 1994, several unidentified men entered the
home of Pat Smith and Brent Jackson at 770 South 1033 West in Provo
at 7:15 a.m. without permission. According to Smith and Jackson
the men held them captive for several hours demanding drugs and
money. The men wanted to know where the drugs were.
3. On May 3, 1994, Pat Smith plead guilty to possession of
marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia in the Fourth
Circuit Court. The crimes were alleged to have occurred January
15, 1993 at the home of Linda Cannon in Orem.
4. Provo City has a solid waste collection system. Each home

02

is assigned a specific can which is owned by
additional can may be obtained for an additional
week the cans are to be placed at curbside or in
collection. A city truck then mechanically picks
the cans.

the city.
An
fee. Once per
the street for
up and empties

5. On June 8, in the early morning hours, I went to the home
of Pat Smith at 770 South 1033 West in Provo. There were two cans
with the number •1033* stenciled in white paint on the side in the
street in front of the house. I took the cans to the Police
Department where I reviewed the contents. After I had finished I
replaced the garbage in the cans and returned them to the street in
front of the house.
6.
Within the cans I found marijuana stems, seeds, a
marijuana cigarette along with zig-zag papers and a small piece of
marijuana. I tested the small piece with a chemical reagent test
which indicated positive for marijuana.
7. I also found correspondence with the address of 770 South
1033 West, Provo and the names of Pat Smith and Brent Jackson. The
correspondence included a utility bill to Brent Jackson for natural
gas. A phone bill for Brent and Pat Jackson was also located.
8. The amounts of stems, seeds and marijuana in the garbage
imply possession of small amounts for use.
Such amounts of
marijuana are typically packaged in bags of 1/8 ounce or less,
quite small in volume. Such bags can quickly and easily be hidden
in clothing or destroyed if notice is given of intent to search.
9. Marijuana and paraphernalia are often kept in outbuildings
and vehicles. Failure to search the curtilage of the residence
together with the person of individuals present and vehicles
located on the curtilage will likely result in officer's missing
important evidence.
10. It is my experience that most of the people I have
encountered in connection with the unlawful use of marijuana also
occasionally sell, sometimes paying for their use with profit from
sales.
It is so common as to be the rule rather than the
exception, to find evidence related to production and/or
distribution whenever marijuana is located in a residence.
11. The residence is more particularly described as a two
story duplex with tan brick and brown wood on the front. On the
side the brick extends to the eaves. There is a carport on either
side. The roof is gravel. The duplex is on the south side of 770
South and faces north.
"1033" is the west residence with the
number "1033" mounted to the right of the door as you face the
door.
12. I expect to locate additional controlled substances in the
residence together with associated paraphernalia including items
used or capable of use for the storage, use, production, or

Discovery Sent To
Defense Attorney

distribution of marijuana.
KHBREFORE, your affiant requests that a warrant be issued by
this Court authorizing a search of the residence together with the
curtilage and the person of all vehicles and individuals present
within the home and curtilage at the time of the search for the
presence of controlled substances together with associated
paraphernalia including items used or capable of use for the
storage, use, production, or distribution of marijuana to be
executed without notice of intent or authority in the daytime.
Dated this <PT&&Y of June, 199 */, fl-.m.

fr^Al^

Affiant(/
Subscribed ,ito and sworn before me this
, 1994, ££7m.

P

day

of

Discovery Sent To
Defense Attorney
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FOR OFHCAL P^mst* D»^T

'

KUtovioJ

CARLYLE K. BRYSON, #0473
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
JAMES R. TAYLOR, #3199
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801) 370-8026
Attorneys for the Plaintiff

Discovery Sent To
Defense Attorney
JUL 0 6 1994
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IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH, EX PARTE,
IN THE MATTER OF:
SEARCH WARRANT
A NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION
TEE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER OF THE STATE OF
UTAH:
Magistrate's
Endorsement

dlAt

It has been established by oath or
made or submitted to me this
June, 1994, that there is probab%
cause to believe the following:

formation
£^Say of

1. The property described below:
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed;
has been used or is possessed for the purpose of
being used to commit or conceal the commission of
an offense; or
is evidence of illegal conduct.
2. The property described below is most probably located
upon the person or at the premises also set forth
below.
3. The person or entity in possession of the property is
a party to the alleged illegal conduct.
4. The property described below may be quickly destroyed,
disposed of, or secreted or physical harm may result
to some person is prior notice is given of the search.

NOW, THEREFORE YOU AND EACH OP YOU# are hereby directed to
conduct a search of the residence and curtilage together with
vehicles and the person of individuals within the curtilage located
at the address of 770 South 1033 West, Provo, in Utah County,

State of Utah#

The premises are described as:

A two story duplex with tan brick and brown
wood on the front.
On the side the brick
extends to the eaves. There is a carport on
either side. The roof is gravel. The duplex
is on the south side of 770 South and faces
north. •1033 * is the west residence with the
number "1033 • mounted to the right of the door
as you face the door.
You are directed to search for the presence of the following
property:
Controlled substances together with associated
paraphernalia including items used or capable
of use for the storage, use# production, or
distribution of marijuana.
THIS KARRANT KAY BE SERVED:
IN THE DAYTIME
THIS WARRANT MAY BE SERVED WITHOUT NOTICE OF AUTHORITY OR
PURPOSE BEING GIVEN BY THE OFFICER
IF YOU FIND THE DESCRIBED PROPERTY, you are directed to bring
the property forthwith before me at the above court or to hold the
same in your possession pending further order of this court. You
are instructed to leave a receipt for the property with the person
in whose possession the property is found or at the premises where
the property was located. After execution of the warrant you shall
promptly make a verified return of the warrant to me together with
a written inventory of any property seized, identifying the place
where the property is being held.
THIS WARRANT MUST BE SERVED KITHIN TEN (10) DAYS FROM THE DATE
OF ISSUANCE.

Dated t h i s

da\ of June, 1994,
0 day

/ / [S~3

JKvx.

^<^^v

SSKS?c^Th»wTo
A\MMAJ
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ADDENDUM C

IN IKS FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Fou*>* JuoiDa1 District Court
o< Uic^ County, State of Utah
- A ^ , A D CM.UH, Clerl'
Der/J--

RULING ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 941400506

vs.

CASE NO. 941400507

PATRICIA E. SMITH,
RAQUEL NIELSEN,
BRENT JACKSON,

CASE NO. 941400508

DATE: March 23, 1995
Defendants.

JUDGE: LYNN W.DAVIS

This matter came before the Court on Defendants9 Motion to suppress. Oral arguments
were heard on February 7, 1995. Defendants appeared and were represented by Thomas H.
Means, with the State being represented by James R. Taylor, Deputy Utah County Attorney.
The Court, after carefully considering the memoranda and oral arguments, now enters the
following:
RULING
L
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
On the eighth of June 1994f Sergeant Jerry Harper, of the Provo Police Department
searched the trash receptacles, (two), of the Defendants" home after they had been placed in
the street for collection. According to the information in the affidavit in support of the
requested warrant, the officer identified no reason for the search of the trash cans. He did,
however, mention two previous incidents which implicated the residents in drug involvement:

1
•

*/ v/
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1) approximately 36 days prior to the search of the trash receptacles, one of the residents pled
guilty to possession of marijuana and paraphernalia; 2) approximately 56 days prior to the
search of the receptacles, two of the residents were involved in an incident where several men
entered their home and held them captive while demanding money and drugs.
Sergeant Harper found within the receptacles some marijuana stems, seeds, Zig-Zag
papers, and a small "piece91 of marijuana. Also found was some personal correspondence with
the names of two of the residents of the home in question. Based on the results of the search
an affidavit was prepared and submitted to a magistrate. The Affidavit also mentioned the
prior drug-related incidents. A warrant was issued for the home, and further evidence was
found during the search of the home. Defendants were arrested and charged with possession
of drugs and paraphernalia.
H
ISSUES PRESENTED
(1) Is the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant fatally flawed, and
therefore, lacking a substantial basis for issuance of a warrant?
(2) Do Utah citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy in trash placed in a city
provided container and left at the edge of the city street for pickup?
EL
DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Affidavit
Defendants argue that some of the information contained in the Affidavit in support of
:he warrant is irrelevant. This Court agrees. Several of the paragraphs in the Affidavit

2
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include information which is curious to the magistrate's determination of probable cause.
However, such information does not invalidate the warrant The burden placed upon the State
in placing an affidavit before a magistrate is *a reasonable belief that the evidence sought is
located at the place indicated by the policeman's affidavit." State v. Brooks. 849 P.2d 640,
643 (Utah App. 1993). Assuming, arguendo, that all the paragraphs mentioned by Defendants
in their memorandum were determined to be irrelevant, and therefore, removed from
consideration, State v. Potter. 860 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1993), there is still sufficient
information in the iiffidavit to establish probable cause. Under Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213
(1983), a "totalitv of the circumstances" analysis is proper and, even with the limited
information left after removing the alleged irrelevant information, a magistrate could have a
reasonable belief that the "evidence sought," (drugs), would be found "at the place indicated."
BrocV- 849 P.2d at 643.
Defendants* argument that the evidence in the trash receptacles was 'stale1 is
i

^rsuasive. While it is conceivable that the trash could have been there for longer than a

**^ek, it is reasonable for the magistrate to conclude that the trash had been in the containers
for a week or less. Thus a "common-sense reading of the affidavit" would suggest that drugs
would probably be in the home. State v. Hansen. 732 P.2d 127,131 (Utah 1987).
Defendants9 argument that the prior bad acts were stale or improper may have some
validity. Sergeant Harper does appear to justify his search of the trash receptacles by
including references to prior involvement and alleged involvement with drugs. (See Affidavit
paragraphs 2 & 3). While Defendants do not support their position with any case law or

3
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statutory claim, it does strike the Court as improper to justify a search on the prior history of
the individuals to be searched.
Other arguments made by the Defendants are neither persuasive nor supported by
substantive law. The Court finds that the Affidavit is not fatally flawed and that a
substantial basis existed in the Affidavit, under current law, for the magistrate to issue the
warrant

B. The Right of Privacy in Garbage under the Federal Constitution and the Utah
Constitution.
The next issue to be resolved is whether Utah citizens have a protectable expectation
of privacy in garbage placed in a city provided container and left at the edge of the street for
pickup? This issue has two parts: 1) The protection of an expectation of privacy in garbage
allowed by the provisions of the U.S. Constitution and federal case law; and 2) The
protection of an expectation of privacy in garbage under the provisions of the Utah
Constitution.
1. Protection under the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
The controlling federal case is California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), which
establishes the principle that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in trash placed
outside the curtilage of the home. Id. at 37. The Supreme Court did not address whether
searches of garbage left within the curtilage of the home were prohibited under the Fourth
Amendment I£. While the present case is similar to Greenwood, it can, contrary to the
assertions of the State, \z distinguished from Greenwood. In Greenwood, the police officer

4
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had recei

that illicit drugs had been shipped to the address

in question, and acting on that information began a surveillance of the home. Based on
suspicious activity at the address in the course of ilk1 sinveiiiiincf, iiiiie1 cjiitcn searched the
trash and found sufficient evidence to establish the probable cause necessary for issuance of a
warrant I& ** 37-38. In the instant case, much of what supported the actions it'll 1 |>nl <
tiif Umryyoe'd ere is lacking. However, in spite of these distinguishing facts the warrantless
search of the garbage in the instant case did not violate the two prong test of Greenwood. 14
at V9"
In applying the first part of the Greenwood test the United States Supreme Court held
that such warrantless searches "would violate the Fourth Amendment
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage . . ." LJ. While no affidavits
or other evidence were submitted with memoranda to show that defendants had such an
expectation of pi i ac; in tl icii gai bage. coi i nsel at oral argument offered to have defendants
testify to that fact The Court declined such testimony as being unnecessary to reach a
determination on the expectations of the defendants.
be accepted that the defendants had such an expectation of privacy; this, however, is not the
end of the federal protection examination.
The s: cc Iid part of the Greenwood test must also be met before protection is warranted
under tije Fourth Amendment — the expectation of privacy must be one that "society accepts
as objectively reasonai

in Greenwood determined that such

an expectation of privacy in garbage Is not reasonable when the garbage is placed on the curb
uf. Jongside the street because it theu becomes vulnerable to an unscrupulous per s ::>iI >r
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scavenging animal. Because a reasonable person would know that such garbage is available
to curious members of the public, any expectation of privacy is unreasonable. A reasonable
person cannot expect "police . . .to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that
could have been observed by any member of the public." IsL at 41.
In the instant case, the Defendants left their garbage at the edge of the city street,
outside of the curtilage of the home, for collection where it was available for the possible
perusal of anyone who wished to take the time to do so. Therefore, there is no question that
the second test under Greenwood has not been met. However, the U.S. Supreme Court also
suggested that "States may surely construe their own constitutions as imposing more stringent
constraints on police conduct than does the Federal Constitution." IsL at 43. The Court
recognizes that while a state may not construe its own state constitution to infringe upon the
rights set forth in the Federal Constitution, a state may provide for greater protection of its
citizens' rights than that provided by the Federal Constitution. Therefore, this Court must yet
consider whether the subject search was a violation of state guarantees embodied in the Utah
State Constitution.
2. Protection under the Utah Constitution.
There are some additional facts, established from the presentation of evidence through
proffer and by the Court taking judicial notice, which are pertinent to the state constitutional
analysis. These facts are: 1) garbage containers in the city of Provo are owned and supplied
by the city; 2) garbage collection occurs weekly and on a day certain; 3) collection is made
by city employees in city owned trucks; 4) the garbage containers in question were owned by
the city of Provo; 5) the garbage container in question- was placed on city property,

6

os:ensibly for collection purposes, and was putside the curtilage of the residence; 6) no local
ordinance exists which prohibits any person from ciist i u: bing garbage
for collection or in anyway restricting access to such garbage.
The final issue is whether there is a greater protection of onefs expectation of privacy
under the UtaJ Constitution. Specifically, does Utah society, under the state
constitution, accept as oi
Defendants argue

tively reasonable, an expectation of privacy in garbage?
' the"" InMniy nl lliiili i<, tini.,j ,i nriil

"h a societal expectation

that individuals have a reasonable belief that their garbage would be free from governmental
intrusion. The original pioneer settlers of the region suffered :i i nicl i at tl ,e hands of a i i :>i is
state governments because of their religious beliefs and communal, ecclesiastically directed
society. In three different states the government either ignored or condoned the persecution
eventually flee to, and settle the Utah basin. Even
after this region was settled, the people, especially the society leaders, continued to suffer
persecution at the hands of federal
homes and effects without warrants in an attempt to enforce the anti-polygamy laws. (See
Defendants* Memorandum pp. 24 • 25). Defendants, therefore, argue that such actions created
distrust and si ispic ion of government on the part of the drafters of the Utah Constitution.
This mistrust and suspicion would have motivated them to expect greater protection against
such invasit

ronically, the

wording of the appropriate provision, Article 1, Section 14, of the Utah Constitution is nearly
identical to the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and therefore, at first glance
would appear to hold the same level jf protection as does the Federal Constitution.

Whether the Utah constitution supports an expectation of privacy in trash is unresolved
in Utah. Other states have found that an expectation of privacy is reasonable under their state
constitutions. While the determination of other sovereign states is not determinative of the
question, the rationale and reasoning used by them may be helpful in considering the issue.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey found in State v. Hcmpele. 576 A.2d 793, (N.I
1990), that under the relevant provision of that state Constitution, Article I, Section 7f an
expectation of privacy need only be reasonable.1 LL &t 802. The facts in Hempele. (which
was a consolation of two cases), are similar to the facts in the instant case; the garbage was
placed for collection near the street and then removed by police and searched. The New
Jersey court appears to reach its conclusion based on concerns that "[cjlues to people's most
private affairs can be found in their garbage.... A plethora of personal information can be
culled from garbage: a single bag of trash testifies eloquently to the eating, reading, and
recreational habits of the person who produced it." Hempele 576 A.2d at 802-803. Further,
local ordinances prohibited "any person to * * * disturb * * * garbage * * * placed on any
curb, street or public place." I$L at 805, (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court of Indiana also found that an expectation of privacy in garbage is
reasonable. Moran v. Indiana, 625 N.E. 1231 (Ind. 1993). The facts of the Indiana case are
again similar to the instant case: garbage had been placed in plastic containers and set out for

1

The New Jersey Constitution reads "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons/ houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly uescribing the
place to be searched and the paprcs and things to b* seized."
N.J. Const, of 1947 ar'c.I, p*ca 7.
8
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collection at the end of the residential driveway approximately a
contains

foot

from

c

which the police removed and searched. In

Moran the court stated that *[u]nder Indiana law, warrantless searches are presumptively
unreasonable, and the burden is placed on the stale to sho b * that the search falls within one of
the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. The common thread underlying the
recognized exceptions is the concept of 'exigent circumstances*
of a warrant impractical or inadvisable because of a danger of harm to individuals or the
potential destruction of evidence." I& at 1239. The court went on to find that no exigent
c

the garbage violated the protection against

unreasonable search and seizure found in Art. I, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution.2
In State v. Tanaka,

H 11. ""'", IS ' Tie Court of Hawaii found

that an expectation of privacy existed in garbage. The facts of the Tanaka case, which entail
three consolidated cases, are similar to the instant case but there is one important
tliMinguJ1,liirife* (Ji.ifdi fcrWic-the garbage searched was located within the private property of
the individual being charged Thus, the police had to trespass onto the private property to
gain access to the garbage

e of the three consolidated cases

the garbage was at the curbside of the defendants property. In the view of the Hawaii court,
the Hawaii Constitution, article I, § 7 "recognizes an expei t,]fn > • I" j ,,; , br,\ u\ l "l

2 The I n ( ji a n a constitution reads: "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violate^;
and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized." Article If * 11,
Indiana Constitution.
9

ftC

parallel provisions in the Federal Bill of Rights." 14. at 1276. The Hawaii court went on to

[pjeople reasonably believe that police will not indiscriminately rummage through their
trash bags to discover their personal effects. Business records, bills, correspondence,
magazines, tax records, and other telltale refuse can reveal much about a person's
activities, associations, and beliefs. If we were to hold otherwise, police could search
everyone's trash bags on their property without any reason and thereby learn of their
activities, associations, and beliefs. It is exactly this type of overbroad governmental
intrusion that article I, § 7 of the Hawaii Constitution was intended to prevent.1
Tanaka 701 R2d at 1276,1277.
The Hawaii court explained that an expectation of privacy did not preclude any
searches by police of garbage but required that a warrant be obtained or that exigent
circumstances be shown which would reasonably justify a warrantless search. I&
The state of Washington also has found an expectation of privacy in garbage under the
Washington State Constitution. In State v. Boland. 800 P.2d 1112 (Wash. 1990),
Washington's highest court utilized criteria previously set down in State v. GunwalL 720 P.2d

3

The text of article I, § 7 of the Hawaii Constitution

reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches,
seizures and invasions of privacy shall not be violated; and
no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized
or the communications sought to be intercepted.
Interestingly enough the Hawaii Constitution has an
additional provision regarding the right of privacy. This is
article I, 5 6, which reads:
The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall
not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state
interest. The legislature shall take affirmative steps to
implement this right.
10
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mi 1 1 - i ml difference uw provide a basis for a conclusion which would

differ from that reached under the Federal Constitution; 2 ) differences in parallel provisions
o f the state and federal constitutions could dictate varying conclusions;

<v

history may reflect an intention to confer greater protection than the federal provisions; 4 )
Previously established state law may provide die basis to define die scope o f a state
5) Differ*

o f the constitutions may require disparate

results, (e.g. the state may guarantee rights which are not protected on a federal level); ^
The matter may be of particular state

Gun wall. 720 P.2d at 812, 813.

The Washington Supreme Court rejected die federal analysis stating that "[w]hile a
person must reasonably expect a licensed trash collector will remo\e
c i "

expectation does not also infer an expectation of governmental intrusion." Boland.

800 P.2d at 1117. Further, the Washington court using the criteria set forth in Gun wall found
that a search of garbage u «• m i i

i i in |l • |MK M* affairs and therefore a violation o f

the Washington Constitution, Art. I, § 7. 4 & at 1114-1116.
Of the states which have found a greater protection
the federal scheme allows, two have significant constitutional textual differences from the
Fourth Amendment; both Hawaii and Washington have unique and explicit wording which
1

der reading o f protection than found in the Fourth Amendment
Indiana and N e w Jersey, on the other hand, have state constitutional provisions which

are nearly identical to t:J* ,e Fc >iu (ii A i i HE i : ci i i i intt ai id th i: I Ji alii provision, In both the Indiana

4

The Washington Constitution provides at Art. I, § 7 that:
"No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home
invaded, without authority of law*"
11

and New Jersey cases, the facts were essentially the same as in the instant case, and the
highest state court still found a heightened level of protection of an expectation of privacy in
garbage.
However, while recognizing that some states have found a greater level of privacy
protection in their state constitutions, this Court must also recognize that the majority of states
have followed the federal analysis, and have not found independent grounds to provide for
greater protection than that provided by the Fourth Amendment in this area.5

5

Hillman v. State, 834 P.2d 1271 (Colo. 1992) (defendant
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage bags left at
curb for collection); Walls v. State, 536 So.2d 137, 138-39 (Ala.
Crixn. App. 1988), cert, denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989) (search of
defendant's garbage located in front of his residence did not
violate a proprietary interest in it, citing Greenwood); State
v. Moonev, 588 A.2d 145, 157 n. 14, cert, denied, 502 U.S. 919,
112 S.Ct. 330 (Conn. 1991) (observed that trash bags, while
closed containers, may not carry a reasonable expectation of
privacy when placed beyond the curtilage of a home for
collection); State v. Fisher, 591 So.2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1991) (concluded that defendants sufficiently exposed
their garbage to the public to defeat Fourth Amendment protection
when placing it in plastic cans located in front of the house on
the road right-of-way); Perkins v. State, 398 S.E.2d 702, 704
(Ga. App. 1990) (followed Greenwood^; People v. Collins, 478
N.E.2d 267, 278-79, cert, denied, 474 U.S. 935 (111. 1985) (found
no reasonable expectation of privacy in a garbage bag left on a
second floor landing of an outside stairway because such area was
an openly accessible common area of the apartment building);
State v. Henderson, 435 N.W.2d 394 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (found no
violation of the Iowa Constitution where evidence was seized from
trash bags that were tied shut and placed in metal garbage cans);
In re Forfeiture of U.S. Currencyf 450 N.W.2d 93, 94 (Mich. App.
1989) (followed Greenwood)i State v. Krech, 403 N.W.2d 634,
637-38 (Minn. 1987) (concluded that defendants did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage wrapped in plastic
bags and placed in cans in back of a duplex a few feet away from
an alley where defendants customers typically walked near the
garbage in route to the back entrance); State v. Texel. 433
N.W.2d 541, 543 (Neb. 1989) (held that no reasonable expectation
of privacy exists in garbage which has been made accessible to
the public); Commonwealth v. Perduef 564 A.2d 489, 493 (Pa.
Super. 1989), appeal denied, 574 A.2d 68 (1990) (found no
12
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In the states which found a level of privacy protection greatei iiiw the iff J'.1 nil ?i I cuie,
a philosophical argument-that unless restraints are placed
on the police powers of government, those who exercise those powers will abuse it. There is
%

DO question that the general put

the police began to randomly pick up

garbage placed in front of residences' looking for evidence of wrongdoing. Even those
citizens who are model citizens would likely become paranoid about tlieu In ^ and examine
each item discarded, looking for anything which could or might lead to possible arrest or even
public embarrassment Such arguments have a certain attra- j^ess in that they are easily
recon

of the protection inherent in the Bill of Rights.

However, philosophical arguments are often stretched too far. The mere parading of a list of
horribles does not make

and personnel constraints

placed upon police make such actions unlikely. In the various cases examined by this Court
the police have not randomly selected an individuals garbage, i I ii

"
: h »ii

nable

suspicion that illegal activity was taking place within the house from which the garbage came.
Reaching a balance between the two conflicting ideas of personal liberty and
communal safety requires a

shifting of resources and authority because societal

values change. Not long ago, each home would bum its own garbage and spread the ashes to
the wind-today society does not accept such
Society has developed different technology to handle the garbage produced in day-to-day

reasonable expectation of privacy £ n garbage left for collection
subject to public inspection); State v. Stevens. 367 N-W.2d 788,
797, cert, denied, 474 U 3 , 852 (Wis. 1985) (found that, as trash
moves farther from the home, any expectation of privacy in it is
diminished)*

living. These technology changes have influenced the way we, as a society, view personal
liberty. Any determination of the expectations of society must be weighed against the norms
of today, as influenced by the past, but not by the values and standards of the past.
In our highly mobile society it would be difficult for someone to remember which
states accept an expectation of privacy in garbage and which do not A uniform standard has
great appeal because of the certainty and stability which it engenders. However, uniformity
benefits ys are not, standing alone, sufficient to determine whether Utah society accepts the
federal scheme of privacy protection in garbage.
The Utah Supreme Court has not addressed expectation of privacy in garbage directly.
The Utah Supreme Court has, however, on at least one occasion interpreted the provisions of
the Utah Constitution in a manner which may be read to expand the civil liberties of the
citizens of Utah beyond the federal threshold. See State v. Thompson. 810 P.2d 415 (Utah
1991), (recognized an expectation of privacy in bank records under state constitution where
the federal constitution does not). The facts of Thompson are sufficiently different from the
instant case to distinguish it from the instant case and for Thompson to be insufficient to
support a greater expectation of privacy in garbage under the Utah Constitution than the
Federal Constitution.
It seems to this Court that any decision which announces a heightened expectation of
privacy in garbage, under a state constitutional analysis, must fairly, reasonably, and clearly
articulate the reasons. Any such decision should not simply be an attempt to viscerally
sidestep Greenwood. The minority arguments in Greenwood are compelling and persuasive,
in the estimation of this Court, but they have failed in every jurisdiction in this country which
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has considered the issue under a Fourth Amendment analysis, and prevailed in only two
joi isdictions, Indiana and New Jersey, under a'state constitutional analysis where the facts are
anywhere similar to this case.
Regardless of how persuaded this I iiij m
i il I" lh llllii iiiiinnih urn1 in breenwoocl this
Court canna reasonably find anything in Utah's unique constitutional history which would
dictate a resc different from Greenwood. A recitation of Utah Mormon pioneer polygamous
battles with federal agents is interesting, but far from relevant and convincing on the very
narrow issue before this Court. A mere substitution of a result this Court favors, without
seiung friiil'i i ciii iew, obi

^IIWC,

sulis'ianii *'r, inml iininilahlf considerations, is judicially

disingenuous, and therefore, would simply subordinate the Fourth Amendment result to this
Court's personal predilections. Certainly that is no way to adopt a bod r ol 'Jml • > «- nii.tiiutunal
law which would give an; guidance and direction. The Court suggests that major departures
from soundly establish?*- ? earth Amendment jurisprudence should be announced by Utahfs
appellate ::: 01 i i ts, i i : t b :~w court judges.
Lastly, even if this Court were to find a heightened expectation of privacy in garbage
under a state constitutional analysis, lluii I uniil

MIDIIUI

lio Moran v. Indiana.

1231 J;-4u, would sustain the subject search. In Moran the Indiana Supreme Court applied a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained during a warrantless search
of garbage put out for disposal, even though the Court later found the search violated its state
constitution. fcL Here, as there, no state court precedent addressed the constitutionality of
:ourt held thp| I . ' •• reasonable for the police to conclude
that the defendants lacked a privacy interest in the garbage.
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Because the Utah Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of an expectation
of privacy in garbage, and no support is found in state lower court rulings to support a result
different from the federal model, the federal threshold must prevail This Court, while
acknowledging the compelling arguments on both sides of the issue, therefore, determines that
no reasonable expectation of privacy exists as to the trash placed by Defendants in containers
owned and provided by the city, and left in the street for collection by city employees.
Neither, the Fourth Amendment, nor Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution is
implicated and, therefore, no warrant was necessary to conduct the search.
IV.
DECISION
(1)

The probable cause Affidavit, filed in support of the search warrant, while arguably

containing spurious information, is not fatally flawed and a magistrate could reasonably
believe that the evidence sought would be found in the home. Accordingly, the motion to
quash the warrant is denied.
(2) The search of trash, placed in a city owned receptacle, left on the city street, with the
anticipation that it would be picked up by city employees, is not a violation of Defendants'

16
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TrlHREFORE, Defendants' Motion to Suppress is denied.

Dated at Provo, Utah, thissS day of

/fm</^j\^%,
BY THE COURT

cc:

7 nomas H. Means, Esq.
James R. Taylor, Esq.
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ADDENDUM D

Seven

On Dumpster
Diving
MeMm cMMHNVr M W AMMMiM p^MST

VfCRfMr | 0 W M V 9 0 0 1 WJmXwwtm*

T
JL^/ong before I began Dumpster diving I was impressed
with Dumpstersf enough so that I wrote the Merriam*
Webster research service to discover what I could about the
word Dumpster. I teamed from them that it is a proprietary
word belonging to the Dempster Dumpier company. Since
then I have dutifully capitalized the word, although k was
lowercased in almost all the citations Merriam-Webster photocopied for me. Dempster's word is too apt. I have never
heard these things called anything but Dumpsters. I do not
know anyone who knows the generic name for these objects.
From time to time I have heard a wino or hobo give some
corrupted credit to the original and call them Dipsy Dump*
iters.
I began Dumpster diving about a year before I became
homeless.
I prefer the word stsvtnging and use the word $ammging
when I mean to be obscure. I have heard people, evidently
meaning to be polite, use the word foraging, but I prefer to
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reserve that word for gathering nuts and berries and such,
which I do also according to the season and the opportunity.
Dumpster Jiving seems to me to be a little too cute and, in my
case9 inaccurate because I lack the athletic ability to lower
myself into the Dumpstcrs as the true divers do, much to
their increased profit.
I like the frankness of the word u*vtnging9 which I can
hardly think of without picturing a big bbek snail on an
aquarium watt 1 live from the refuse of others. I am a scavenger. 1 think it a sound and honorable niche, although if I
could I would naturally prefer to live the comfortable con*
sumer life, perhaps—and only perhaps—as a slightly lest
wasteful consumer, owing to what I have learned as a scavenger.
While Ltzbeth and I were still living in the shack on Avenue B as my savings ran out, I put almost all my sporadic
income into rent. The necessities of daily life I began to extract from Dumpstcrs. Yes, we ate from them. Except for
jeans, all my clothes came from Dumpstcrs. Doom boxes,
candles, heckling, toilet paper, a virgin male love doll, medicine, books, a typewriter, dishes, furnishings, and change,
sometimes amounting to many dollars—I acquired many
things from the Dumpstcrs.
I have learned much as a scavenger. I mean to put some of
what I have learned down here, beginning with the practical
art of Dumpster diving and proceeding to the abstract.
What b safe to eat?
After all, the finding of objects is becoming something of
an urban art. Even respectable employed people will some*
timesfindsomething tempting sticking out of a Dumpster or
standing beside one. Quite a number of people, not all of
them of the bohemian type, are willing to brag that they
found this or that piece in the trash. But eating from Dumpstcrs is what separates the dilettanti from the professionals.
Eating safely from the Dumpstcrs involves three principles:
using the senses and common sense to evaluate the condition

Om DmmptUr BMmg - — —
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of the found materials, knowing the Dumpstcrs of a given
area and checking them regularly, and seeking always to answer the question "Why was this discarded?**
Perhaps everyone who has a kitchen and a regular supply
of groceries has, at one time or another, made a sandwich and
eaten half of it before discovering mold on the bread or got
a mouthful of milk before realizing the milk had turned.
Nothing of the sort is likely to happen to a Dumpster diver
because he is constantly reminded that most food is discarded
for a reason. Yet a lot of perfecdy goodfoodcan be found in
Dumpstcrs.
Canned goods, for example, turn op fairly often in the
Dumpstcrs I frequent. All except die most phobic people
would be willing to eat from a can, even if it came from a
Dumpster. Canned goods are among the safest of foods to be
found in Dumpstcrs but are not utterly foolproof.
Although very rare with modem canning methods, botulism is a possibility. Most other forms of food poisoning
seldom do tasting harm to a healthy person, but botulism is
almost certainly fatal and often the first symptom is death.
Except for carbonated beverages, all canned goods should
contain a slight vacuum and suck air when first punctured.
Bulging, rusty, and dented cans and cans that spew when
punctured should be avoided, especially when the contents
are not very acidic or syrupy.
Heat can break down the botulin, but this requires much •
more cooking than most people do to canned goods. To the
extent that botulism, occurs at all, of course, it can occur in
cans cm pantry shelves as well as in cans from Dumpstcrs.*
Need I say that home-canned goods are simply too risky to
be recommended.
from time to time one of my companions, aware of the
source of my provisions, will ask, "Do you think these cracken are really safe to eat?M [x>r some reason k U most c>ften the
crackers they ask about.
This question has always made me angry. O f course I
would not offer my companion anything I had doubts about.
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But more than that, I wonder why he cannot evaluate the
condition o f the crackersforhimself. I have n o special knowledge and I have been wrong before. Since he knows where
the food comes from, it seems to m e he ought t o assume
some o f the responsibility for deciding What he will put in hit
mouth. For myself I have few qualms about dry foods sucfi
as crackers, cookies, cereal, chips, and pasta if they are free of
Visible contaminates and still dry and crisp. Most often such
things are found in the original packaging, which is not so
much a positive sign as it is the absence o f a negative one.
Raw fruits and vegetables with intact skins seem perfectly
safe t o me. excluding o f course the obviously rotten. Many
are discarded for minor imperfections that can be pared away.
Leafy vegetables, grapes, cauliflower, broccoli, and similar
things may be contaminated by liquids and may be impractical to wash. .
Candy, especially hard candy, is usually safe if it has not
drawn ants. Chocolate is often discarded only because k has
become discolored as the cocoa butter de-emulsified. Candying, after all. is one method o f food preservation because
pathogens d o not like very sugary substances.
All o f these foods might be found in any Dumpster and
can be evaluated with some confidence largely cm the basb o f
appearance. Beyond these arc foods that cannot be correctly
evaluated without additional information.
I began scavenging by pulling pizzas out o f the Dumpster
behind a pizza delivery shop. In general, prepared food re*
quires caution, but in this case I knew when the shop closed
and went to the Dumpster as soon as the last o f the help left.
Such shops often get prank orders; both the orders and the
products made t o fill them are called bogm. Because help
seldom stays long at these places, pizzas are often made with
the wrong topping, refused o n delivery for being cold, or
baked incorrectly. T h e products to be discarded are boxed up
because inventory is kept by counting boxes: A boxed pizza
can be written off; an unboxed pizza does not exist
I never placed a bogus order t o increase the supply o f
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pizzas and I believe no one else was scavenging in this Dump*
ster. But the people in the shop became suspicious and began
to retain their garbage in the shop overnight. While it bsted
I had a steady supply of fresh, sometimes warm pizza. Because I knew the Dumpster I knew the source of the pizza,
uttd because I visited the Dumpster regularly I knew what
was fresh and what was yesterday's.
The area I frequent is inhabited by many affluent college
students. I am not here by chance; the Dumpsters in this area
ate very rich. Students throw out many good things, including food. In particular they tend to throw everything out
when they move at the end of a semester, before and after
breaks, and around midterm, when many of them despair of
college. So I find it advantageous to keep an eye on the
academic calendar.
Students throw food away around breaks because they do
not know whether it has spoiled or will spoil before they
return. A typical discard is a half jar of peanut butter. In fact,
nonorganic peanut butter does not require refrigeration and
is unlikely to spoil in any reasonable time. The student does
not know that, and since it b Daddy's money, the student
decides not to take a chance. Opened containers require caution and some attention to the question. "Why was this discarded?" But in the case ofdiscards from student apartments,
the answer may be that the item was thrown out through
careles*»«"ts. ignorance, or wastefulness. This can sometimes
be deduced when the item is found with many others, in*
eluding some that are obviously perfectly good.
Some students, and others, approach defrosting a freezer
by chucking out the whole lot. Not only do the circumstances of such a find tdl die story, but also the mass of
frozen goods stays cold for a long time and items may be
found still frozen or freshly thawed.
Yogurt, cheese, and sour cream are items that ait often
thrown out while they ate still good. Occasionally I find a
cheese with a spot of mold, which of course I just pare off.
and because it is obvious why such a cheese was discarded. I
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treat it with less suspicion than an apparently perfect cheese
found in similar circumstances* Yogurt is often discarded,
still sealed, only because the expiration date on the carton had
passed* This is one of my favorite finds because yogurt will
keep for several days, even in warm weather.
Students throw out canned goods and staples at the end of
semesters and when they give up college at midterm. Drugs,
pornography, spirits, and the like are often discarded when
parents are expected—Dad's Day, for example. And spirits
also turn up after big party weekends, presumably discarded
by the. newly reformed. Wine and spirits, of course, keep
perfectly well even once opened, but die same cannot be said
of beer.
My test for carbonated soft drinks is whether they still fin
vigorously* Many juices or other beverages are too acidic or
too syrupy to cause much concern, provided they are not
visibly contaminated. I have discovered nasty molds in vegetable jukes, even when the product was found under its
original seal; I recommend that such products be decanted
slowly into a dear glass. Liquids always require some care.
One hot day I found a large jug of Pat O'Brien's Hurricane
mix. The jug had been opened but was still ice cold. I drank
three Urge glasses before it became apparent to me that some*
one had added the rum to the mix, and not a little rum. I
never tasted the rum, and by the time I began to fed the
effects I had already ingested a very Urge quantity of the
beverage. Some divers would have considered this a boon,
but being suddenly intoxicated in a public place in the early
afternoon is not my idea of a good time.
I have heard of people maliciously contaminating discarded
food and even handouts, but mostly I have heard of this from
people with vivid imaginations who have had no experience
with the Dumpsters themselves. Just before the pizza shop
stopped discarding its garbage at night, jalapenos began
showing up on most of the thrown-out pizzas. If indeed this
was meant to discourage me, it was a wasted effort because
I am a native Texan.
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For myself, I avoid game, poultry, pork, and egg-based
foods, whether I find them raw or cooked. I seldom have the
means to cook what I find, but when I do I avail myself of
plentiful supplies of beef, which is often in very good con*
dition. I suppose fish becomes disagreeable before it becomes
dangerous. Uzbeth is happy to have any such thing that is
past its prime and, in fact, does not recognize fish as food
until it is quite strong.
Home leftovers, as opposed to surpluses from restaurants,
are very often bad. Evidently, especially among students,
there is a common type of personality that carefully wraps up
even the smallest leftover and shoves k into the back of the
refrigerator for six months or so before discarding H. Characteristic of this type are the reused jars and margarine tubs to
which the remains are committed. I avoid ethnic foods I am
unfamiliar with. If I do not know what it is supposed to look
like when it is good, I cannot be certain I will be able to tell
if tt is bad.
No matter how careful I am I still get dysentery at least
once a month, oftener in warm weather. I do not want to
paint too romantic a picture. Dumpster diving has serious
drawbacks as a way of life.
.1 learned to scavenge gradually, on my own. Since then 1
have initiated several companions into the trade. I have
learned that there is a predictable series of stages a person
goes through in learning to scavenge.
At first the new scavenger is filled with disgust and td£»
loathing. He is ashamed of being seen and may lurk around,
trying to duck behind things, or he may try to dive at night.
(In fact, most people instinctively look away from a scavenger. By skulking around, the novice calls attention to himself
and arouses suspicion. Diving at night is ineffective and need*
lessly messy.)
Every grain of rice seems to be a maggot. Everything seems
to stink. He can wipe the egg yolk off the found can, but he
cannot erase from his mind the stigma of eating garbage.
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That stage passes with experience. The scavenger finds a
pair of running shoes that fit and look and smell brand-new.
He finds a pocket calculator in perfect working order. He
finds pristine ice cream, still frozen, more than he can eat or
keep. He begins to understand: People throw away perfectly
good stuff, a lot of perfectly good stuff.
At this stage, Dumpster shyness begins to dissipate. The
diver, after all, has the last laugh. He isfindingall manner of
good things that are his for the taking. Those who disparage
his profession are the fools, not he.
He may begin to hang on to some perfectly good things
for which he has neither a use nor a market. Then he begins
to take note of the things that are not perfectly good but are
nearly so. He mates a Walkman with broken earphones andone that is missing a battery cover. He picks up things that he
can repair.
At this stage he may become lost and never recover.
Dumpsters arc full of things of some potential value to some*
one and also of things that never have much intrinsic value
but are interesting. All the Dumpster divers I have known
come to the point of trying to acquire everything they touch.
Why not take it, they reason, since it is all free? This is, of
course, hopeless. Most divers come to realize that they must
restrict themselves to items of relatively immediate utility.
But in some cases the diver simply cannot control himself. I
have met several of these pack-rat types. Their ideas of the
values of various pieces of junk verge cm the psychotic. Every bit of glass may be a diamond, they think, and all that
glisters, gold.
I tend to gain Weight when I am scavenging. Partly this is
because I always find far more pizza and doughnuts than
water-packed tuna, nonfat yogurt, and fresh vegetables. Also
I have not developed much faith in the reliability of Dumpsters as a food source, although it has been proven to me
many times. I tend to eat as if I have no idea where my next
meal is coming from. But mostly 1 just hate to see food go to
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waste and so I eat much more than I should. Something like
this drives the obsession to collect junk.
As for collecting objects, I usually restrict myself to collecting one kind of small object at a time, such as pocket
calculators, sunglasses, or campaign buttons. To live on the
street I must anticipate my needs to a certain extent: I must
pick up and save warm bedding I find in August because it
will not be found in Dumpsters in November. As I have no
access to health care, I often hoard essential drugs, such as
antibiotics and antihistamines. (This course can be recommended only to those with some grounding in pharmacology. Antibiotics, for example, even when indicated are worse
than useless if taken in insufficient amounts.) But even if I
had a home with extensive storage space, 1 could not save
everything that might be valuable in some contingency.
I have proprietary feelings about my Dumpsters. As 1 have
mentioned, it is no accident that I scavenge from ones where
good finds are common. But my limited experience with
Dumpsters in other areas suggests to me that even in poorer
areas, Dumpsters, if attended with sufficient diligence, can be
made to yield a livelihood. The rich students discard per*
fectly good kiwifruit; poorer people discard perfectly good
apples. Slacks and Polo shifts are found in the one place; jeans
and T-shirts in the other. The population of competitors
rather than the affluence of die dumpers most affects the
feasibility of survival by scavenging. The large number of
competitors is what puts me off the idea of trying to scavenge
in places like Los Angeles.
Curiously, I do not mmd my direct competition, other
Scavengers, so much as I hate the can scroungers.
People scrounge cans because they have to have a little
cash. I have tried scrounging cans with an able-bodied companion. Afoot a can scrounger simply cannot make more
than a few dollars a day. One can extract the necessities of life
from the Dumpsters directly with far less effort than would
be required to accumulate the equivalent value in cans. (These
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observations may not hold in places with container redemption laws.)
Can scroungers, then, are people who must have small
amounts of cash. These are drug addicts and winos, mostly
the latter because the amounts of cash are so small. Spirits
and drugs dot like all other commodities, turn up in Dump*
sters and the scavenger will from time to time have a half
bottle of a rather good wine with his dinner. But the wino
cannot survive on these occasional finds; he must have his
daily dose to stave off the DTs. All the cans he can carry will
buy about three bottles of Wild Irish Rose.
I do not begrudge them the cans, but can scroungers tend
to tear up the Dumpstcrs, mixing the contents and Uttering
the area. They become so specialized that they can see only
cans* They cam my contempt by passing up change, canned
goods, and readily hockable items.
There are precious few courtesies among scavengers. But
it is common practice to set aside surplus items: pairs of
shoes,'clothing, canned goods, and such, A true scavenger
hates to see good stuff go to waste, and what he cannot use
he leaves in good condition in plain sight.
Qui scroungers lay waste to everything in their path and
will stir one of a pair of good shoes to the bottom of a
Dumpster, to be lost or ruined in the muck. Can scroungers
will even go through individual garbage cans, something I
have never $€tn a scavenger do.
Individual garbage cans are set out on the public casement
only on garbage days. On other days going through them
requires trespassing dose to t dwelling. Going through individual garbage cans without scattering Utter is almost impossible. Litter is likely to reduce the public's tolerance of
scavenging. Individual cans are simply not as productive as
Dumpstcrs; people in houses and duplexes do not move so
often and for some reason do not tend to discard as much
useful material. Moreover, the time required to go through
one garbage can that serves ooe household b not much less
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than the time required to go through a Dumpster that contains the refuse of twenty apartments.
But my strongest reservation about going through individual garbage cans is that this seems to me a very personal
kind of invasion to which I would object if I were a householder. Although many things in Dumpstcrs are obviously
meant never to come to light, a Dumpster is somehow lea
personal.
I avoid trying to draw conclusions about the people who
dump in the Dumpstcrs I frequent. 1 think it would be unethical to do so, although I know many people will find the
idea of scavenger ethics too funny for words.
Dumpstcrs contain bank statements, correspondence, and
other documents, just as anyone might expect. But there are
also less obvious sources of information. Pill bottles, for example. The bbels bear the name of the patient, the name of
the doctor, and the name of the drug. AIDS drugs and antipsychotic medicines, to name but two groups, are specific
and are seldom prescribed for any other disorders. The plastic compacts for birth-control pills usually have complete
label information.
Despite all of this sensitive information, I have had only
one apartment resident object to my going through the
Dumpster. In that case it turned out the resident was a university athlete who was taking bets and who was afraid I
would turn up his wager slips.
Occasionally afindtells a story. I once found a small paper
bag containing some unused condoms, several partial tubes
of flavored sexual lubricants, a partially used compact of
birth-control pills, and the torn pieces of a picture of a young
man. Clearly she was through with him and planning to give
up sex altogether.
Dumpster things are often sad—abandoned teddy bears,
shredded wedding books, despaired-of sales kits. Ifindmany
pets lying in state in Dumpstcrs. Although I hope to get off
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the streets so that Lizbeth can have a long and comfortable
old aget I know this hope is not very realistic So I suppose
-when her time comes she too will go into a Dumpstcr. I will
have no better place for her. And after all9 it is fitting, since
for most of her life her livelihood has come from the Dumpstcr. When she finds something I think is safe that has been
spilled from a Dumpstcr, I let her have it She already knows
the route around the best ones. I like to think that if she
survives me she will have a chance of evading the dog catcher
and of finding her sustenance on the route.
Silly vanities also come to rest in the Dumpsters. I am a
rather accomplished necdlcworker.* I get a lot of material
from the Dumpsters. Evidently sorority girls, hoping to impress someone, perhaps themselves, with their mastery of a
womanly art, buy a lot of cmbtoidcr-by-number kits, work
a few stitches horribly, and eventually discard the whole
mess. I pull out their stitches, .turn the canvas over, and work
an original design. Do not think I refrain from chuckling as
I make gifts from these kits.
I find diaries and journals. I have often thought of compiling a book of literary found objects. And perhaps I will
one day. But what I find is hopelessly commonplace and bad
without being, even unconsciously, camp. College students
also discard their papers. I am horrified to discover the kind
of paper that now merits an A in an undergraduate course. I
am grateful, however, for the number of good books and
magazines the students throw out.
In the area I know best I have never discovered vermin m
the Dumpsters, but there are two kinds of kitty surprise. One
is alley cats whom I meet as they leap, claws first, out of
Dumpsters. This is especially thrilling when I have Uzbeth in
tow. The other kind of kitty surprise b a plastic garbage bag
filled with some ponderous, amorphous mass. This always
proves to be used cat litter.
City bees harvest doughnut glaze and this makes the
Dumpstcr at the doughnut shop more interesting. My faith
in the instinctive wisdom of animals is 11ways shaken when-

ever I see Lizbeth attempt to catch a bee in her mouth, which
she does whenever bees are present. Evidently some birds
find Dumpsters profitable, for birdie surprise is almost as
common as kitty surprise of the first kind. In hunting season
all kinds of small game turn up in Dumpsters, some of it,
sadly, not entirely dead. Curiously, summer and winter,
maggots are uncommon.
The worst of the living and near-living hazards of the
Dumpsters are the fire ants. The food they claim is not much
of a loss, but they are vicious and aggressive. It is very easy
to brush against some surface of the Dumpstcr and pick up
half a dozen or more fire ants, usually in some sensitive area
such as the underarm. One advantage of bringing Lizbeth
along as I make Dumpstcr rounds b that, for obvious reasons, she b very alert to ground-based fire ants. When Uzbeth recognizes a fire-ant infestation around our feet, she
does the Dance of the Zillion Fire Ants. I have learned not to
ignore this warning from Uzbeth, whether I perceive the tiny
ants or not, but to remove ourselves at Lizbeth's first pas de
bourse. All the more so because the ants are the worst in the
summer months when I wearflip-flopsif I have them. (Perhaps someone will misunderstand thb.. Lizbeth does the
Dance of the Zillion Fire Ants when she recognizes more fire
ants than she cares to eat, not when she b being bitten. Since
I have learned to react promptly, she does not get bitten at
all. It b the isolated patrol of fire ants that falls in Lizbeth**
range that deserves pity. She finds them quite tasty.)
By far the best way to go through a Dumpstcr b to lower
yourself into it. Most of the good stuff tends to settle at the
bottom because it b usually weightier than the rubbish* My
more athletic companions have often demonstrated to me
that they can extract much good material from a Dumpstcr I
have already been over.
To those psychologically of physically unprepared to enter
a Dumpstcr, I recommend a stout stick, preferably with some
barb or hook at one end. The hook can be used to grab plastic
garbage bags. When I find canned goods or other objects
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loose at the bottom of a Duutpstet1 1 lower a bag into it, toll
the desired object into the bag, and then hoist the bag out—a
procedure more easily described than executed. Much
Dutnpster diving is a matter of experience for which nothing
will do except practice.
Dutnpster diving if outdoor work, often surprisingly
pleasant. It is not entirely predictable; things of interest turn
up every day and some days there are finds of great value. I
am always very pleased when I can turn up exactly the thing
I most wanted tofind*Yet in spite of the element of chance,
scavenging more than most other pursuits tends to yield re-,
turns in some proportion to the effort and intelligence
brought to bear. It is very sweet to turn up a few dollars in
change from i Dutnpster that has just been gone over by a
wino.
The land is now coveted with cities. The cities are full of
Dumpsters. If a member of the canine race is ever able to
know what it is doing, then Lizbeth knows that when we go
around to the Dumpsters, we are hunting. I think of scavenging ** * modem form of self-reliance. In any event, after
having survived nearly ten years of government service,
where everything is geared to the lowest common denominator, I find it refreshing to have work that rewards initiative
and effort. Certainly I would be happy to have a sinecure
again, but I am no longer heartbroken that I left one.
I find from the experience of scavenging two rather deep
lessons. The first is to take what you can use and let the rest
go by. I have come to think that there is no value in the
abstract. A thing I cannot use or make useful, perhaps by
trading, has no value however rare or fine it may be. I mean
useful in a broad sense—some art I would find useful and
some otherwise.
I was shocked to realize that some things are not worth
acquiring, but now I think it is so. Some material things are
white elephants that eat up the possessor's substance. The
second lesson b the transience of material being. This has not
quite converted me to a dualist, but it has made some head-

*»ay in that dircctkm. I do not suppose ttut ideas ate faunaetal, but certainly mental things are longer lived than other
material things.
Once I was the sort of person who invests objects with
sentimental value. Now I no longer have those objects, but I
have the sentiments yet.
Many times in our travels I have lost everything but the
clothes I was wearing and Lizbeth. The things I find in
Dumpsters, the love letters and rag dolls of so many lives,
remind me of this lesson. Now I hardly pick up a thing
without envisioning the time I will east it aside. This I think
is a healthy state of mind. Almost everything I have now has
already been cast out at least once, proving that what I own
' b valueless to someone.
Anyway, I find my desire to grab for the gaudy bauble has
been largely sated. I think this is an attitude I share with the
very wealthy—-we both know there is plenty more where
what we have came from. Between us are the rat-race mil*
lions who nightly scavenge the cable channels looking for
they know not what.
I am sorry for them.
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